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This thesis is about recursive methods and dynamic contracts. 
Contracts. The contours of contract theory as a field are difficult to define. ìviany 
would argue that contract theory is a subset of Gan1e Theory which is defined by thc 
notion that o ne party into the game ( typically called the principal) make an offer t o the 
other parti es ( the agent ( s)). 
Others \vould argue that contract theory is an extension of price theory in the fol-
lowing sense. Price theory studies how actors interact where the actors are allowed to 
choose prices, wages, quantities, etc. and studies partial or generai equilibrium outcomes. 
Contract theory extends the choice space of the actors to include richer strategies (i.e. 
contracts) rather than simple one-dimensional eh o ice variables. For example, an employer 
can offer its employee a wage schedule for differing levels of stochastic performance (i.e. 
an incentive contract ) rather than a simple wage. 
Broadly, for contract we mean an allocation mechanism. In this sense, most of eco-
nomics is - explicitly or implicitly - bargaining, writing and executing contracts. Here, 
fron1 contract theory we adopt its main methodological simplification: we substitute an 
equilibrium problem -vvith a ma.-ximization one. The design of a Pareto optimal con-
tract proceeds by maximizing o ne party's expected utility subject to the other party (or 
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parties) receiving a minimum (reservation) expected utility level. 
The fact that market forces reduce to simple constraints on expected utilities greatly 
facilitates equilibrium analysis. Equilibration in expected utilities is usually trivial. This 
gives the contractual approach the main methodological advantage relative to models 
of imperfect competition, for instance. The analytical core of contract theory is an 
optimization problem and methods for solving optimization exercises are substantially 
more advanced than methods for solving equilibrium problems. 
Of course, substituting an optimization analysis for an equilibrium analysis is not al-
ways economically meaningful. First, there is a decentralization problem. Unfortunately 
there are no generai results about decentralization under incomplete markets1 . We do 
not investigate such important problems. However, we recall that, whenever some sort 
of restricted second vVelfare theorem applies, then our analysis can be reconducted to an 
equilibrium onc using the Negishi {1960) 's Approach[95]. vVhen thc problem is concave, 
an equilibrium problem can be reduced to the one of finding Pareto weights for agents 
such that individuai budget constraints are satisfied2 . Second, the economie credibility 
of the contractual approach may be called into question when, as often happens, optimal 
contracts become monstrous state-contingent prescriptions. This last remark partially 
n1otivate the attempt to use recursive approaches. 
Recursive Methods. The use of recursive analysis is one of the main resources avail-
able today to economists studying dynamic models. In the standard case, it is well 
known how to determine if a model has a recursive structure; for example, Cugno and 
Nlontrucchio (1998)[36] and Stokey and Lucas (1989)[127] describe a large number of 
1There are important exceptions. Fora basic reference see Chapter 19 of I'vlas-Colell, vVhinston and 
Green (1995)[88]. 
2 A new stream of research (see for example Kehoe and Levine (1993-1998)[70][71] and Alvarez and 
Jermann (1995)[8]) uses a contractual approach to study equilibrium and assct pricing under default. 
Those moclel can be considerecl as models of endogenous incomplete markets. 
The same idea of endogcnous incompleteness of markets is in Geanakoplos (1997)[52] who, in a stan-
darcl generai equilibrium analysis, removcd the full enforceability assumption of the Arrow-Debreu set-
ting, introclucing default. 
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models that can be analyzed recursively. The presence of a recursive formulation implies 
t ha t the optimal decisi o n a t time t is a t ime-independent function f of a small set of state 
variables. This property plays a crucial role in many applications of dynamic models for 
several reasons: it facilitates the analysis and empirica! testing of the model; in order 
to compute the solution for all periods, it is enough to approximate just one function; 
contracts can be specified without taking into account all past and present realizations 
of exogenous stochastic shocks (as they would with Arrow-Debreu contracts) since a few 
state variables are sufficient statistic for past history; finally, models of learning can be 
formulateci by specifying f as the object to be learned. 
In a famous paper l(ydland and Prescott (1977) (75] showed that many dynamic eco-
non1ic rnodels of interest failed to be recursive in the traditional sense. This was a well 
known problem in dynarnic games that in economics is termed Time Inconsistency. 
This lack of recursivity is likely to arise in contracting problems, where intertemporal 
participation, incentive or cornpetitive constraints define the set of feasible contracts. 
That is, other agents' future actions may not only affect the return to an agent's current 
action (a standard effect in dynamic models), but also limi t his se t of current feasible 
actions. For exan1ple, the results of an economie policy will depend on agents' future 
actions. This is a standard effect well accounted for by recursive methods. However, in 
designing optimal contracts, agent 's reactions to poli ci es are taken as constraints in the 
mechanism design problem. Despite the interest in studying optimal dynamic contracting 
problems, a generai method for finding a proper recursive formulation is stili absent from 
the literature. 
In this work we previde an integrated approach fora recursive formulation of a large 
class of economie n1odels. vVe show how, in many cases where implementability con-
straints depend on plans for future variables and the originai maximization problem is 
not recursive, an equivalent sequence of ( constrained) Pareto optimal problems can be 
constructed leading to a recursive formulation. 
To show that a large class of economie problems has a common recursive structure is 
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not just a mere technical result. It helps to provide a common economie characterization 
of many contractual problems. In a similar way the development of the recursive com-
petitive equilibrium approach has enhanced our understanding of the common economie 
structure of many dynamic economie models. For example, a standard application of 
the Second Welfare Theorem sho\vs that (in classica! convex economies with complete 
markets) recursive competitive equilibria are solutions to a planner's problem in which 
agents' discounted utilities have constant weights. With intertemporal incentive con-
straints (a form of incomplete markets), the second-best recursive solution corresponds 
to a planner's problem where the weights are changing across time; accordingly, what 
is changing is the point on the Pareto frontier. Finally, showing that a problem has a 
recursive structure is an important result for applied economists who are interested in 
using numerical Inethods. To give some reference, Cooley (1995)[34], :Nlarimon and Scott 
(1998) (87] and Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998) [120] are full of applications for recursive 
n1ethods and computational techniques. 
I t is important t o remark that our analysis is restricted to complete information 
probleins. According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)(51] "\Vhen some player do not 
know the payoffs of the others, the game is sai d t o ha ve incomplete information." So, 
throughout the thesis we assume each agent knows the utility function and the constraints 
faced by the other agents. In particular, we exclude from our analysis adverse selection 
probleins and Bayesian games. 
Contents. The thesis is divided in two parts. In PartI we introduce the methodology. 
Historically, the recursive approach, argument of this thesis, takes birth in the field 
of Repeated Games \vith the work of Abreu (1988)(1] and Abreu Pierce and Stacchetti 
(1990)(3]. They characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs as the largest 
fixed point of recursive set-valued maps. Chapter 2 presents the aspects of repeatecl 
games n1ore strictly linked with Abreu and Abreu, Pierce and Stacchetti's recursive 
approach. The first part of the chapter analyses the case with perfect monitoring. A 
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classica! result in repeated games is the so called one-stage deviation principle, which 
is the multiple agents counterpart of the Bellman's principle of dynamic programming. 
A subgame perfect strategy has the property that none agent has incentive to deviate 
for a single period and, under some bounded conditions, also the converse is true; any 
strategy that satisfies the one-stage deviation principle is subgame perfect. In the second 
part of the Chapter we extend the analysis to games with imperfect monitoring, i.e. to 
the case where agents cannot observe directly the opponent's actions. In this contest 
similar recursive maps on compact sets characterize the set of Public Perfect Equilibrium 
Payoffs3 . 
Chapter 3 is the core of our methodological analysis. Here we restrict attention to 
second-best contracts, i.e. instead of analyzing equilibrium sets with set-valued maps we 
focus our analysis on the Pareto frontier. We can, therefore, exploit effi.ciency properties 
to achieve a proper recursive formulation of the effi.cient contract and define the Bellman 
equation that has to be satisfied by the value function of the problem. 
Similarly to Chapter 2 we first analyze problems with perfect monitoring using a 
classical paradigm in contract theory. The insurance problem. Following I<ocherlakota 
(1996) (73] we allow for default and we characterize second-best, self-enforcing (or sub-
game perfect) contracts. In the second part of the Chapter we analyze the classical 
Principal-Agent problem. When there is moral hazard, insurance is not limited by 
commitment problems but first-best (full-insurance) contracts cannot be implemented 
because the principal has to give the right incentives to the agent who supplies an unob-
servable effort (Imperfect Nlonitoring). 
The main result of the Chapter is that, under some conditions, the infinite horizon se-
quential contracts can be reduced to a sequence of time and history invariant second-best 
contractual problems where the state variable is the expected discounted value henceforth 
promised to the agent. 
3 Public Perfect Equilibria is a natura! refinement of Nash equilibria for these games; introduced by 
Fudenberg, Levine and ivlaskin (1994)[48]. 
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In Chapter 2 - although Propositions 11 and 12 are, to our knowledge, new - the 
main originai contribution is the integrated systematization of known result and the 
simplification of many proofs ( this last due t o the fact that we do not impose minima! 
conditions). I contrast, to our knowledge, Chapter 3 is the first unitary formai analysis of 
this recursive approach. Many economists used these results during the 90s without giving 
always a rigorous mathematical justification. To this extent Section 3.1 and Subsection 
3.2.3 contain a collection of formai proofs to existing conjectures. 
Finally, in Part II we present two originai applied contributions to the use of the 
theory of contracts in dynamic settings. 
When we think about the economie meaning of a contractual analysis a natural ques-
tion arises: "Are such contracts written and enforced ?" This is the basic argument of 
the literature about incomplete contracts4 and the main justification for the inefficiency 
result in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 4 is an independent paper w h ere we criticize o ne of the main (an d com-
monly accepted) assumptions used in theoretical and applied studies about labor supply: 
the Pareto optimality of intra-household resource allocation. To study maritai arrange-
ments with enforceability problems we build a simple dynamic model that uses a contrae-
tua! approach to marriage and shows how inefficiencies can arise in the determination of 
intra-household time allocations. The contractual approach appears to be particularly 
fruitful in interpreting some anomalies in the observed US labor supply patterns. We 
believe this model can represent a useful tool for the analysis of the process of intra-
household decision making in intertemporal settings which views the family institution 
as characterized by long term relationships with symmetric information. 
Chapter 5 applies and extends the recursive techniques presented in Chapter 3 to ana-
lyze an important variation of the Principal-Agent model: the case with career concerns. 
The literature presents the model as a repeated moral hazard problem where is intro-
·'Valuable references about incomplete contracts are Hart (1995)[59] and Hart and :Wioore (1988-
1994) [62][61]. 
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duced a learning process of the worker's productivity parameter. Nloreover, the model 
has limited commitment: the agent can, in any period, walk away from the contract 
and accept a profitable offer from the market. The complexity of the problem induced 
economists to restrict the analysis to the case where the production technology is lin-
ear and additively separable in: productivity parameter, effort and technological shock. 
Moreover, to simplify the model, the few contributions about the analysis of the optimal 
contract assume that the agent do not have preference for intertemporal consumption 
smoothing. Using recursive techniques we can analyze a more generai case and obtain 
new interesting results. In this chapter we present only preliminary results. In particular 
- although some results have clearly a n1ore generai application - the model has been fully 
analyzed only for the case in which the agent has logarithmic utility and the principal is 
risk neutra!. For this particular case we further find a closed forn1 solution of the infinite 






Game Theoretical Foundations: 
Repeated Games 
Repeatcd games providc perhaps tbc simplest model in which self-enforcing arrangements 
can be stuclied forn1ally. It is this aspcct of the repeated game theory that we attempt 
to survey bere. The cbapter focuses on tbc structural and conceptual issues that have 
arisen in recent years in tbe study of repeated discounted games of complete informa-
tion. Therefore we exclude from our analysis the work on repeated games of Incomplete 
Information (Sec 1viertens(1987)(90]) or reputations aspects summarized by Fudenberg 
(1992) (45]. \Ve will present the enormous material very briefly: many basic concepts are 
given as known1 and some definitions are introduced implicitly in the text. The results 
in this chapter are not new2 . Although direct references are given in the text, for a 
generai discussion we refer to Pearce (1992) (100], Chapter 8 of V an Darnme (1987) (134] 
and Chapter 5 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)[51). Sometimes our results are less generai 
that these of the originai papers, and some proofs are slightly different. This reflects our 
rnain aim: to present the results in a simple, unified way. 
\Ve will analyze only some aspects of the literature. First, even though almost every 
1Thc notion of Nash equilibrium (Nash (1950) [94]), and thc notion of extcnsivc game, for example. 
2 Howcver, the proofs of Proposition 11-12 are new, although thcy were conjectured in Fudemberg 
an d Tirole (1991) [51]. 
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result remains true for an arbitrary finite number of players, we will focus on the case 
of two players. This is done for the sake of simplicity and because, in the next chapter 
and in the second part of the thesis, we consider only the two players case. However, 
when the results cannot be extended to the "N players" case we will say i t explicitly. 
Second, we will focus our analysis on the case with an arbitrary discount factor (or rate 
of interest) instead of o n folk theorems. U nderstanding behavior in repeated games with 
discount factor significantly different from l is important for several reasons, including 
the fact that the discount factor may represent impatience in the usual sense, and the 
chance that the strategie interaction may be interrupted by external factors (new laws, 
product innovations, and so on). Third, we will concentrate on pure strategy equilibria. 
~iiuch of the analysis requires comrnon knowledge of the equilibrium path, hence, when 
mixed strategies are allowccl then the proofs are trivial extcnsions of the pure strategy 
case. Fourth, we will focus on infinite horizon rcpcatcd gamcs. Finally, wc will try to 
discuss reprcscntativc applications to applicd ficlds and sornc rcccnt attempts to compare 
the theory with the data in various ways. 
Thc first p art ( the core) of the chapter presents the progress that has been m ade in 
the past decades in understanding supergames equilibria from a technical point of view. 
Section 2 consider models in which players receive inforn1ation without any stochastic 
disturbance, while Section 3 is devoted to games with irnperfect monitoring. Perfect and 
imperfect monitoring should not be confused -vvith the notion of perfect and imperfect 
information. In both Sections we allow for simultaneous moves stage games, so the 
repeated games analyzed in this chapter are of imperfect information3 . The end of the 
chapter is devoted to some applied issues associateci with repeated games theory or the 
recursive techniques used in this chapter. 
3 For formai definitions of informational structures, see Rasmussen[118]. 
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2.1 Perfect Monitoring and Subgame Perfect Equi-
libria 
The building block of a repeated game is the stage game r. Assume t ha t the stage game 
is a finite 2-player simultaneous-move game with action space Ai and stage-game payoff 
functions ui : A -t ~ vvhere A= A1 x A2 . When every Ai is finite, r is called a finite 
game. 
To define the repeated game (or supergame) we must specify the players' strategy 
spaces and payoff functions. This Section considers games in which the players observe 
the realized actions a t the end of each peri od. Thus, l et a t = (ai, aZ) be the actions 
that are played in period t. Suppose that the game begins in periocl O, with the history 
h0 = 0. For t 2 l, let ht = (a0 , a 1, a2 , ... , at_1 ) be the realized choices of actions at all 
pcriods bcfore t, and let f{t = (A)t be tbc space of all possible period-t histories. Sincc 
all players observe h t, a pure strategy si for player i in the repeatecl game is a sequence 
of functions s~ (onc for each period t) that map possible period-t histories ht E Ht to 
actions a i E A i. A m ix ed strategy O" (more properly, a behavior strategy) is a sequence 
of 1naps O"~ : H t -t 1\1i w h ere J\;Ji is the space of probability distributions over A i.J. The 
stagc-ga1ne payoffs of a mixecl action m E A1 are definecl in the obvious way ancl, with a 
slight abuse in notation we denote them as ui (m). Some In ore clefinitions are needed. Le t 
U = co u(A) the convex hull of the set of payoff vector from action profiles in A. Elements 
in U are called feasible values. Note that each player always has the option of playing a 
Inyopic best response to other player's strategy in each period. This observation induces 
us to restrict our equilibrium analysis to a smaller set than U. For each player i define 
his security (or min:irnax) level as: ~~ = IninaiEAi InaXaiEJli ui(a) for pure actions, and 
11:u = IninmJEMJ Ina...X,niEAfi ui(rn) for mixed actions. 
It is uscful to introduce here the definition of a proper subga1ne of an extensive-form 
·lAs usual 1Ì I = 1ìf 1 x A/2 . \Ve remar k t h a t cach player randomization has t o be statistically indc-
pendent. from that of his opponent. 
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game. An extensive-form of a game is better represented by a collection of ordered nodes 
(a t ree). Such no d es are partitioned by information sets ( every n ode is exactly in o ne 
information sets). A t each information se t is common knowledge w ho is the player (or if 
both players have to play simultaneously)5 . 
Definition l In arder G to be a proper subgame of an extensive-form game it has to 
satisfy the following conditions. {i) G must starts from a singie node x of the originai 
extensive-from game. {ii) G must contain all the successors of the node x and {iii) if 
two n od es x' an d x" beiong t o the sa me information se t, then if x' belongs to G, aiso 
x" beiongs to G. {iv) The information sets and the payoffs functions of the subgame are 
inherited from the originai game. That is x' and x" are in the same information set in 
the subgame G if and oniy if are in the same infonnation set of the originai extensive-
fonn game, and the payoffs function on the S'ubgame is just the restriction of the originai 
payoff function to the terminai node x of the subgarne. 
Note that in our repeated game each period of play begins a proper subgamc (that 
wc denotc f(h1·)). l\Ioreovcr, since moves are sin1ultaneous in the stage game, these are 
the only proper subgames. 
There are several alternative specification of payoff functions for the (infinitely) re-
peated game. vVe will focus on the pure strategies case where players discount future 
utilities using discount factor 8 < l. In this game, denoted roo ( 8) = f( 8), player i's 
objective function is to maximize the normalized (average) sum 
00 
vi= (1- 8) L,8tui(st(ht)), 
t=O 
the normalization factor ( 1-8) is frequently usecl by game theorists an d serves to measure 
the stage-game and repeated-game payoffs in the same units: the normalized value of 
one util per period is l. 
5 A formai definition can be fmmd in Fudembcrg and Tirolc [51](pagc 77). An alternative definition 
that avoid the use of game trees is in Osborne and Rubinstein[9G] (page 101). 
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To recapitulate the notation: as in the rest of the thesis, we use superindices for 
agents and subindexes for time. Time is used as a superindices only for histories, since 
they are "t ime aggregates". 
Since in each period begins a proper subgame, for any strategy profile s and history 
ht we can compute the players' payoffs from period t on. We call these the continua-
tion payoffs, and we renormalize them so that the continuation payoffs from time t are 
measured in time-t units. Thus, the continuation payoff from time t on is 
00 
vi(s; ht) = (l- 8) L 8r-tui(sr(hr)). 
r=t 
\Vith this renorrnalization, for any period t, the continuation payoff of a player who 
\vill rcceivc l util per period frorn period t on is l unit. These normalizations and 
rcnonnalizations will be convcnient, as they exploit the stationary structure of the game. 
Garne thcorists focused attention on an irnportant concept that refine the Nash equi-
librium concept in extensive form-garnes. In order to be crcdible, let us require that the 
agreernents be subgarne perject equilibria (SPE) (Selten (1975)(122]). 
Definition 2 A strategy profile s constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
supergarne if, after any history ht of play, the agreed-upon strategy profile gives players 
·instructions that constitute a Nash equilibrium of the proper subgame beginning in period 
t. 
In other \Vords, after no history ht should a player have an incentive to deviate uni-
laterally fro1n his p art of the strategy profile. The se t of aver age ( normalized) values 
of subgan1e perfect equilibria of f(8) are written V(8). vVhen there is no danger of 
an1biguity, we simply write V. 
2.1.1 One-Stage-Deviation Principle 
Si1nplicity is of great in1portance for us. In this direction, consider the follo\ving rcquire-
Inent that, at a first glance, looks n1uch weaker than the perfect responsc condition under 
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pure strategies. 
Definition 3 A strategy si of player i is unimprovable against the strategy of his op-
ponent if there is no history ht such that i could profit by deviating from his strategy in 
peri od t only { conforming thereafter). 
To verify the unimprovability of a strategy, then, o ne checks only "one-stage" devia-
tions from the strategy, rather than arbitrary complex deviations. The following result 
simplifies the analysis of the subgame perfect equilibria immensely. It is the exact coun-
terpart of a well-known result from dynamic programming, and was first emphasized in 
the context of self-enforcing cooperation by Abreu (1988) [l ]G. 
Proposition l Le t the payoffs of r be bounded. In the repeated game r( 8), a strategy 
pro file s is subgame perfect if and only if si is unimprovable for any agent i. 
Proof. If s is a SPE then s has to be unimprovable bccausc in particular at any history 
h t, thc stratcgy s n1ust dcfinc a Nash cquilibrium. For the sufficicncy part the fact 
t ha t u(.) is bounded bccamc i1nportant. Suppose s is unimprovable but no t describc a 
SPE. Uni1nprovability means that there are no profitablc one-stage deviations but wc do 
not know if othcr type of deviations are profitable. vVe consider separatcly two type of 
dcviations that exhaust the set of all possible deviations. Thc deviation s can be finite or 
infinite. (i) Suppose a gencric player i can gain by deviating by a finite number of periods. 
Then call ymax the largest T such that for some hT s~(hT) =/= s~(hr). We have said that 
from unimprovability we have that ymax > t, and ymax is finite by assumption. Now 
consider another strategy Si which agrees with sl for every t < ymax and agrees with s~ 
from ymax (includcd) on. Since si agrees with si from ymax +l on, then unimprovability 
implies that si cannot improve on Si in the subgame starting a t t with history h t. If 
ymax = t + l then Si = si an d we ha ve a contracliction. If ymax > t + l, then we can 
6 The concept was introduced by Howard (1960) [67], other rcferences are vVhittle (1983) [137] or Chap-
ter 6 in Bcrtsekas (1976)[22]. 
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""'7. . • 
similarly construct a strategy s such that agrees with s"' until Tmax - 2 and with s"' from 
Tmax - l included on. Again unimprovability applied twice allow us to conclude that si 
--i 
cannot improve on s and either we reach a contradiction (if Tmax = t + l ) or continue 
the process. Eventually the process reach ht so we have a contradiction. (ii) Suppose 
now that given s, after history h t, agent i can improve on si deviating infinitely many 
times with a strategy si that is unimprovable. Given the previous result it suffice to 
show that if si improves on si with infinite deviations then it must improve on si also 
with finite deviations. This last statement can be proved by showing that if a strategy 
si does not improve on si with finite many deviations then si cannot improve on si. So 
suppose that for any finite T, the deviation strategy si does not improve on si before T. 
Recall that, by assumption, each agent's utilities are bounded and denote with B > O 
the upper bound (i.e. lui(a)l :::; B Va E A). Now consider an arbitrary é >O and the two 
strategics si an cl si. By assumption si cannot improve on si with any finite deviation, 
in particular, si cannot improvc on si before Te: < oo. Whcrc Te is choscn such that 
81~ 2B < E. But if this is true t ben the present evaluation of such dcviation strategy 
satisfies lvi(si, si)- vi( si, si) l :::; lvi( si, si) l + lvi(si, si) l :::; 28Tt: B < E, thus si cannot 
improve on si by é. Since é was arbitrary then we have our result. • 
The boundedness of ui(.) is a sufficient condition for the required continuity to infinity. 
Nioreover, the proof generalizes easily t o a wide variety of dynamic an d stochastic games 
\vith discounting and bounded payoffs. Finally, for notational simplicity, we bave stated 
the principle for pure strategies; the mixed strategy counterpart is straightforward. 
2.1.2 Simple Strategies 
In this and the next subsections the analysis is confined to pure strategies, not only for 
notational simplicity. Indeed, the analysis can (trivially) be extended to mixed strategies 
only if wc assume that mixed actions, not only the outcomes of thc lotteries, can be 
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observed directly7 . 
vVe define a path P as a sequence of action profiles, o ne for each period. N o ti ce 
that an equilibrium strategy profile implicitly specifies what path should be followed in 
equilibrium, what new path should be followed if someone deviates from the originai 
path, and so on. Indeed, a strategy profile can be thought of as a collection of paths and 
a rule governing how to switch among them in the event of deviation. 
vVorking in the space of paths rather than supergame strategies Abreu(1988)[1] could 
prove the compactness of the SPE values set V. One consequence is that severest credible 
punishments exist. For completeness, the next Proposition presents the result (without 
giving the proof). In Section 2.1.3 we use the recursive structure of the SPE to construct 
a sirnpler proof of the con1pactness of V. 
Proposition 2 Let r be a finite garne. Then V is compact and, far each player i there 
e1;ists y_i = rnin {vi l v E V} . 
Proof. Fudenberg ancl Levinc (1983)[47] • 
Remark l Abreu {1988}(1} proved the Proposition under the requirement that Ai are 
cornpact and u(.) continuous. But h e needed to assume that r has a pure-strategy static 
equilibriurn. The result is not yet proved far stage garnes that have only mixed-strategies 
static Nash equilibria. 
The in1portant rneaning of the above staten1ent is that the severest punishments 
are thernselves self-enforcing. Using this fact, Abreu (1988)(1] showecl that for any pure 
strategy subgame perfect equilibria of f(8) there is another SPE that has the same value8 
a nel can be clescri be d by only 3 paths an d an extremely elementary rule. 
7 For limit results like Folk Theorems this assumption is not so crucial, most of the result remain true 
after solving the additional statistica! problcm of testing 'vhether a deviatior1 has occurred. In contrast, 
in Sori n ( 1986) [125] therc is an cxample in which thc lottery obscrvabili ty requirement became crucial 
with arbitrary discount factors. 
~Equilibria that gi\·e the same value are ca.lled payoff-equivalent or simply equivalent equilibria. 
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Proposition 3 Let r be a finite game with bounded payoff. Then v E V if and only if 
ca n be obtained by the following simple strategy ss. Call P0 the path that lead v as a SP E 
payoff and pi the {self-enforcing) path the leads y_i as aSPE payoffs for player i. Then: {i) 
start playing P0; {ii) if player i alone deviated from the ongoing path pk (k = O, l, 2) then 
switch to the worst equilibrium payoff path pi (from the beginning) {iii) if both players 
deviate simultaneously from the ongoing pk, then remai n under pk (do nothing). 
Proof. If v E V then the simple strategy ss implements v because v was implemented 
with a punishment not worst then 1i so it can implemented also with the strategy ss. 
The converse is true if we show that the simple strategy mentioned above is itself a SPE. 
From the unimprovability result of Proposition l i t suffice to show that, given the simple 
strategy ss, is never profitable to deviate once from any ongoing path pk. But deviating 
frorn pi i = l, 2 is never profitable because fron1 the fact pi is a SPE path we ha ve that 
any continuation payoff impliccl by pi has to guarantce a cliscounted utility level not less 
y_i, so restarting from the beginning pi is a sufficient punishment for the path pi be a 
SPE. For the same reason, under ss, i t is never profitable to eleviate from P0 . • 
Thc sufficiency part of the proof summarizes the Abreu (1988)[1]'s idea that switching 
to the severest punishment path gives the highest collusion level. This idea of existence 
of an optirnal penal code gives an upper bouncl of the collusion level ancl was useful in 
proving the Folk Theorem of Fudenberg ancl Levine (1983)[47]. 
2.1.3 Self-Generation and the Characterization of the SPE val-
ues set 
The sweeping characterization of equilibrium values \Vhen 8 is near l (Folk Theorems) 
has no analogue for arbitrary discount factors. There is however, a useful sufficiency 
conclition for sets of values to be subsets of the supergame value set. The result, callecl 
self-generation \Vas clevelopecl by Abreu, Pierce ancl Stacchetti (1986)-(1990) [2] [3] for 
games with imperfect monitoring, but the principle behind it is quite generai, and in 
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Proposition 4 below we show how it applies in the simple case of perfect monitoring. 
Self-generation is in the spirit of dynamic programming, in the sense that it depends on 
the decomposition of a supergame profile into the induced behavior today, and the value 
of behavior in the future, as a function of possible actions today. The following discussion 
tries to motivate the result0 . 
What makes playing the first peri od of r( 8) different from playing r in isolati an ? In 
the former case, each player is interested in maximizing a weighted sum of his immediate 
payoff in r, an d his continuation payoffs in the remainder of the game. In equilibrium, 
the vector of continuation payoffs after a particular first- peri od history is drawn from the 
(subgame perfect) equilibrium value set V of f(8). Thus, 




Proof. If v E V then there n1ust exist an equilibrium path. Then take a as defined by the 
equilibrium an d se t w( a) equal t o the continuation payoffs implied by the equilibrium. 
IVIoreover, if for each player i, we set wi(ai, al) equal to the punishment continuation 
values in case of i deviates, then we have that the couple (a, w) satisfies (2.1) and (2.2). 
Conversely, suppose t o exist a couple of actions a E A an d a function w(.) which satisfy 
(2.1) ancl (2.2), then it is possible to construct an equilibrium strategy as follows. Take a 
as the first peri od action couple a = s0 (h0 ). Fro1n (2.2) a satisfies the one-stage deviation 
property. IVIoreover, sin ce by definiti o n w (a) E V, then, as in the first p art of the 
!J As mentioned, in the case of perfect monitoring of the randomiziong device, the analysis can be 
extended for mixed strategies. Bere we considcr only pure stategies. 
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proof, there must exist an equilibrium path. Use this path from t = l on starting from 
h1 = (h0 ,a). Hence v= (vl,v2 ) as defined by (2.1) is a normalized payoffof a subgame 
perfect equilibrium (v E V) • 
The action a represents the first-period action and w(a) the contingent continuation 
payoffs. Notice that since A is finite, then the function w(.) is simply a finite collection of 
two dimensionai vectors of continuation values, one vector for any possible combination 
of actions. One component of each vector for each player. 
Notice that when one is allowed to manipulate first period behavior using continuation 
values from V, one generates exactly the elements of V as values of equilibria createci in 
the augmented static games with payoffs (1 - 8)ui(a) + 8wi(a). More generally, think of 
augmenting payoffs by values drawn from an arbitrary set X ç ~2 , and cali the values 
generateci D(X) : 
D(X) ={(l- 8)u(a) + 8w(a) l w: A---+ X, and (a, w) satisfies (2.2)}. 
Proposition 4 can be paraphrased in tern1s of the rnap D : 2~2 ---+ 2~2 as: V is a fixed 
point 10 of D, V = D(V). 
In what follows, let Dt(X) denote the t-th iteration of D on X, i.e. 
Definition 4 A nonempty set X ç ~2 is called self-generating if X ç D(X). 
If X is self-generating, there is enough variety in the payoffs in X to create incentives 
for different equilibria in the corresponding augmented games, indeed enough to generate 
any value of X 11 . This leads to the conjecture that the values in X are actually equi-
librium values, because they are able to generate themselves, just the \vay supergame 
10 Not necessarily the only one. See ncxt footnotc. 
11 A trivial example, of a self-generating set is the payoffs of a static equilibrium; static equilibria are 
the only one-point self-generating sets. 
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equilibria generate equilibrium values by using supergame equilibrium values as contin-
uation payoffs. The following Proposition is important for both theoretical and applied 
purposes. It gives a sufficient condition for a set to be formed by SPE payoff values. The 
compactness requirement is not needed but allow us to construct a very simple proof 
which gives useful insights and connections with the previous subsection. 
Proposition 5 Let r be a finite game and 8 E (0, l),and let D : 21R2 ----+ 21R2 as defined 
above. Then if X ç ~2 is compact and self-generating, then D(X) ç V. Indeed, for 
t= 1,2, .. , .. Dt(X) ç V 
Proof. The proof requires to show that elements in a set are values of a SPE. We can 
use the simple strategies approach developed in the previous Section to construct this 
equilibrium. Since X is compact we can choose ;ri = min {xi l x E X} . Now take a 
g·cneric v0 E D( X), by definition t h ere exists an action vector ag an d a v1 E X such t ha t 
the following versi o n of (2.1 )-(2.2) is verified: 
and 
. . . o . . 
V
1 > (l - 8) max u 1 (0: a '1 ) + OX1 Vi o ~· ' o -a t 
Since X ç D( X) then from vi E X we have VI E D(X) and the process can be continued. 
Continuing inductively we get for any t E N 
Note that we have constructed in this way a path P0 . Since this procedure can also 
be followed for any x E X that has at least one component cqual to ;ri then we can 
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construct also the worst paths pi for each player i. The desired equilibrium strategy 
s with payoff vector v0 is completely determined by the 3-tuple of paths (P0 , P 1 , P 2) 
constructed above. In words s is described as follows: the players start with P 0 ; as long 
as no deviations from a path pk ( k = O, l, 2), the players continue with P\ if player i 
is the unique deviator then the path switches to pi (the worst path for player i); ifa 
situation cannot classified as one of the above, then players restart P 0 . We claim that s is 
a SPE. Because of the simple structure of s, t o verify this claim i t suffi.ce t o show t ha t all 
paths ( P0 , P 1 , P 2 ) are equilibrium paths. Proposition 3 apply directly to our 3-tuple of 
paths. The unique condition to verify is t ha t ~i are individually rationale, i.e. ~i ~ 1f~, 
but fro1n self-generation (X ç D(X)) the condition (2.2) guarantees the requirement. • 
Tbe proof is an exa1nple of bow the simple strategy framework can be used to construct 
SPE strategies. Now some Propositions tbat bave independent importance and introduce 
to tbc last rcsult of this Scction. Tbc nu1nerical algorithm. 
Proposition 6 Jf X ç R2 is compact then D(X) is compact. 
Proof. Since X is compact we can cboose 'ii = max {~i, 1!:~}, the worst credible payoffs 
in X. In tbis case x E D(X) if and only if tbere exist a E A and w( a) E X sucb that: 
x (l - b)u(a) + bw(a), and 
Now, in orcler to verify tbat the set of points describecl is compact we will prove that 
from any sequence Xn containecl in D(X) for any n we can construct a subsequence that 
converges to an element in D(X). Since A is finite we can without loss of generality 
consider sequences for which an = a Vn. Definecl ai,* the ma.ximizing strategy under 
tbe fixed equilibrium opponent's action a), i.e. ai,* E arg Inaxai ui(iii, a1). By the fact 
that each Xn of the sequence is enforcecl with the same 'ii we bave to considcr only two-
dimensional vectors Wn such that Vn .Xn = (l- b)u(a) +bwn, and x~1 ~ (l- b)ui(ai,*, a1) + 
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D'ii Vi with Wn E X. Notice that the function Xn = f(wn) = (1-b)u(a)+Dwn is continuous 
and invertible, so the sequence is uniquely defined by the sequence of Wn· Now, since 
X is compact and Wn E X Vn, then the sequence Wn has a convergent subsequence that 
converges to a w E X. From the properties of the function f(wn), also Xn converges 
to x = (l - b)u(a) + Dw which satisfies the condition (2.2). So we have constructed a 
convergent subsequence of Xn that converges to an x E D(X) • 
A simple-proof allows to show the monotonicity properties of the map D. 
Proposition 7 If X' ç X" then D(X') ç D(X"). 
Proof. If x E D(X') then exist a couple of actions a and a vectorial function w( a) E X' 
that enforce x. But sin ce X' ç X", the same continuation value function can enforce the 
value x with w(a) E X", so x E D(X"). • 
Cornbining the previous Propositions wc have the following corollary which givcs an 
in1portant proof of compactness. 
Corollary l If the finite game with bounded payoffs r has a static equilibria, then V is 
non empty and compact. 
Proof. V is non-empty because infinite repetition of the static equilibria is a SPE. The 
set is bounded because u(.) is bounded. Denote cl V the closure of V. W e know that V is 
a fixed point of D so from Proposition 7 we have that V= D(V) ç D(clV). Now from 
Proposition 6 we ha ve that D( cl V) is a compact set and from the monotonicity property 
of the closure of a set we ha ve cl V ç cl D( cl V) = D( cl V). But this is the self-generation 
property and from Proposition 5 we have that clV ç D(clV) C V so V is closed and 
compact. • 
Another imrnediate consequence of the previous Propositions is the following corollary 
which characterize the SPE set. 
Corollary 2 V is the largest fixed point of the ma p D. 
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Proof. Consider a generic fixed point X* = D(X*). As in the previous proof: from 
Proposition 7 we have X* ç D(X*) ç D(clX*), and from Proposition 6 we have clX* ç 
D( cl X*) because D( cl X*) is closed. Finally, from self-generation and the properties of 
closure, we have X* ç clX* ç V. Since V is a fLxed point of D then we have the result. • 
Self-generation has many applications, both theoretical and practical, and will be 
encountered again in subsequent Sections. The following proposition is the main result 
for such applications. 
Proposition 8 Let r be a finite game with bounded payoffs, 8 E (0, 1), and D the as-
sociate generation map. For any compact X ç ~2 with V ç D(X) ç X we have 
Proof. Frorn Propositions 7 and 6 we bave 
00 
V ç Xoo = lim .)Cn = n Xn 
n---?00 
t= l 
\vith .)(n a decreasing sequence of compact sets so Xoo compact. By Proposition 5 to 
obtain X 00 ç V it suffices to show that .-'C00 is self-generating (Xoo ç D(Xoo) ). Take a 
generic elen1ent x E X 00 ; we shovv that x can be sustained with elements in X 00 itself. 
By definition V n we have (an, wn) that sustain x, i.e. x = (1 - 8)u(an) + 8wn(an), 
\Vith Wn E Xn. Since A is finite we can without loss of generality consider sequences 
such that an = a V n, and, since X is compact and Xn ç X V n, then we can take a 
subsequence of actions and continuation values functions such that Wni (a) ~ w(a) E X 
Va. N"ow define W m the set of vectors wm(a) E Xm that sustain x. From W m ç Xm ç Xn 
V m ~ n we have that the limit set W ç Xn V n. Since Xoo = n:1 Xn then vV ç 
Xoo so by construction w(a) E X 00Va. It remain to show that such limit w(a) actually 
sustains x. But x = (1 - 8)u(a) + 8w(a) because, by the compactness of X, we took a 
convergent subsequence of wn(a) and the function is continuous in wn(a) and invertible. 
The inequality x ~ (l - 8)u(ai, aj) + 8w(ai, aj) remains true because i t was true V n. • 
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The previous Proposition is important for many reasons. First, it gives an algorithm 
for computing the equilibrium value set: choose any set that is "large enough" (U will do 
for example), an d apply the ma p D repeatedly. The limi t of this process is V. Recently, 
Cronshaw (1997)[35] showed how the Gauss-Jacob iteration and the Newton iteration al-
gorithms can be used to find the SPE value set of repeated games. His technique involves 
finding the largest solution of a scalar equation to find the best polytope approximation 
of the set V, and uses a recursive dynamic programming approach. Second, Fudenberg 
and Levine (1983)[47] showed that for a substantial class of games including discounted 
repeated games, supergame perfect equilibria are limits of c-perfect equilibria of T-period 
truncations of the supergame, as c ---+ O and T ---+ oo. Although their result is not pre-
sented in terms of value iteration, the algorithm presented in Proposition 8 is closely 
related to thcir limit thcorern. Instead of increasing the equilibria of the T-period game 
r'~'( b) by computing c-cquilibria, augmcnt the cquilibrium valuc sct by supplemcnting 
period T payoffs with rcward functions drawn from any set X of the kincl specified in 
Proposition 8. Hence for T= 2, the sct of supplemented values is X2 = D(D(X)), and 
for arbitrary T one has the supplement value set Xr. Thus as T ---+ oo, this procedure 
approximates the value set V of r(o), since li1n Xr =V. 
T--->oo 
vVe saicl we are concerned with the analysis of repeated games \vhen the discount 
factor is significantly different from one, but sometimes players' primary concern is for 
the future. Thus the perfect discounted folk theorem of Fudenberg an d J\1askin (1986) [49] 
occupies a special place in the literature. We end this Section with the statement of the 
folk theorem ( without proving i t). 
Proposition 9 Let r be a finite two-person game, and v be feasible and strictly individ-
ually rational (far each i, vi > 1!:.~1 ). There exist o* su eh that fa T all t5 E (o*, l), v is the 
average discounted value of some subgame perfect equilibrium of r( 8). 
Proof. Fudenberg and lviaskin (1986)[49]. • 
The proof depends critically on the possibility of players simultaneously minimaxing 
one another (indeed, an example of Forges, lviertens and Neyman (1986) [44] showed that 
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values in which some player receive exactly their security level may not be the payoff of 
any perfect equilibrium with discounting). This minimaxation cannot always be clone in 
N-person games, as Fudenberg and l\!Iaskin (1986)(49] showed. So they introduced a new 
requirement known full dimensionality condition12 . 
2.2 lmperfect Monitoring and Public Perfect Equi-
libri a 
In many economie examples of practical interest, the assumption that player's observe 
one other's action became inappropriate. Instead, the players observe the outcome of 
some randon1 variablc (team output, nun1ber of product failures or consumer complains, 
market price, and so on ) whose distribution is affected by the private action of some 
or all the playcrs. In this Scction we analyze this kind of problems. Tbc games rcmain 
of complete informati an, however now we allow for uncertainty, i.e., the nature moves 
after cach player chooses tbc action. Because of this uncertainty, the actions cannot be 
perfectly monitorecl and we say imperfect monitoring. 
Positive results for models of this kind first appeared for games without discount-
ing. The pioneering papers by Radner (1981)[108], and Rubinstein and Yari (1983)(115] 
proved that in infinitely repeated principal-agent games of various kinds, i t is possible to 
overcome the inefficiency associateci with the moral hazard problem in the static model. 
Rubinstein and Yari also remarked that their argument could be extended to yield a 
perfect folk theorem for agency games with imperfect monitoring. 
Here we do not analyze explicitly problems of adverse selection and misrepresentation. 
However, mechanisrn design problems can sometimes be analyzed within our framework. 
Self-generation and related techniques are first developed in the context of the Green-
Porter model (Green and Porter (1984)[55], Abreu Pierce ancl Stacchetti (1986)[2]), and 
12 Thc condition of full dimensionality amounts roughly to the possibility of indepcndcnt minima..xation 
(and rewarding) of each player. 
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then developed in greater detail in Abreu Pierce and Stacchetti (1990)[3] (APS there-
after). For completeness, we summarize here informally their result. Suppose that play-
ers take private actions ai E Ai (finite), i = l, 2, that determine the density f(z; a) 
of a commonly observed random variable z with constant support Z. APS analyzed 
the case \vhere z can assume a continuum of values. Player i's expected payoff are 
J ri(ai, z)f(z; a)dz = ui(a). Note that each player's realized payoff ri(ai, z) depends only 
on his own action and the public signal. This is so because otherwise, player i's payoff 
could give him information about his opponent's play. In pure strategy equilibria of the 
repeated game, one-shot incentives are supplemented by continuation values drawn from 
the equilibrium value set V ç ~2 . The continuation equilibria in effect create a (measur-
able) reward function wi now rnapping Z into V13 . Hence, the natural value generation 
function to look at in this case is E : 2iR2 -4 2iR2 defined by: 
(1 ~ O)u;(a) +O j w;(z)f(z; a)dz > (1 ~ O)u;(a;, ai)+ O j w;(z)j(z; a', ai)dz 
Vai E Ai, i= l, 2. (2.3) 
- { xE~2 13(a,w)EAXL00 (Z,X)s.t. } 
B(X) = x= (1 ~ O)u(a) +O J w(z)f(z; a)dz and (a, w) satisfies (2.3) . 
Again if X is non-empty bounded and X ç B(X), X is called self-generating. As 
discussed above, Self-generation is the multi-player generalization of the principle of 
optimality of discounted dynamic programming, which gives a sufficient condition for a 
vector of payoffs, one for each state, to be the maximal present value obtainable when 
starting play in the corresponding state. This value generation approach led to a number 
of resul ts summarized below. 
13 \Ve use the notation V because we wil see that in the APS pure strategies framework actually thcy 
find the set of SPE as Sequential Equilibria. 
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Proposition 10 (i) (sufficiency, self-generation) If X is self-generating, then X C 
u:1 .Bt(X) ç v. (ii) {bang-bang) v is compact, B(V) = B(coV) and for all v E v 
there exists an equilibrium whose implicit reward functions after each history take only 
values in the set of extreme points of V. (iii) (necessity, algorithm) If X is bounded 
and V ç X, then n:1 Bt(X) = V. (iv) (monotonicity) If O < 81 < 82 < l, then 
[
18:1 ] V(8 1 ) ç [18:2 ] V(82 ). 
Proof. See APS (1990) • 
The recursive formulation has three useful consequences. The sufficiency character-
ization, part (i) in the above Proposition, says that if a subset of feasible payoffs can 
be shown to be self-generating, then all of its elements are equilibrium payoffs; this 
( constructive) approach can be used to provi de upper bo un d o n the difference between 
second-bes t an d efficicnt payoffs. This approach is used by Fudenberg, Levi ne an d :Niaskin 
(1989)[48] to prove the folk theorem under imperfcct monitoring. A second (inductive) 
approach can be employed to determine properties of the second-best equilibrium. In this 
approach one conjectures that the equilibrium payoff set has the properties one seeks to 
establish and then demonstrate that such properties are, in fact, maintained under the 
recursion. APS have utilized this approach to provide conditions on the primitives under 
which the equilibrium payoff set is compact, convex and monotonically increasing in the 
discount factor ((ii) an d (iv)). Finally the (iii) part of the Propositi an is the recursive 
characterization of the equilibrium set and can be used to construct numerical algorithms. 
2.2.1 Public Equilibria and Stationarity 
The scope of the APS's analysis is limited in three ways in arder to maintain the "recursive 
structure" of the supergame equilibria: players ha ve no private signals, they use only pure 
strategies, and the commonly observed signal has constant support. When any of these 
restrictions is relaxed, some equilibria may, after certain histories, have continuation 
profiles that are not Nash equilibria of the supergame. This arise because imperfect 
correlation may develop in the actions of different players who are conditioning their 
29 
behavior on private signals from earlier periods (including realizations of their own mixed 
strategy randomizing devi ce). 
Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1989) [48] introduce the concept of public equilibria of 
a supergame and avoid all the three restrictions in a superbly pragmatic stroke. Let Z the 
set of public signals. For public signal we intend all the variables of common knowledge 
and, in the repeated game, we define the public information (or public history) at the 
beginning of period t as 
Zn E Z 
to avoid measurability problems, we assume Z be finite. 
Now wc allow players to bave private information at time t (namely his own past 
choice of actions); dcnote this by hi,t. A pure strategy for player i is a sequence of maps 
fron1 player i's timc-t information to action space Ai; s~(zt, hi,t). Though all players know 
the public history zt at date t, each player i also knows hi,t, the actions he has chosen in 
the past. 
Definition 5 A strategy profile s is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) if, (i) for all 
time perìods t and all players i, the continuation of si after history (zt, hi,t) only depends 
on the public history zt and (ii) the profile of continuation strategies constitute a Nash 
equilibrium after every history zt. 
Note that a player is not restricted to choose a strategy in which he can only condition 
on the public history. Second, note that SPE would not be restrictive in these games, 
since the only proper subgame is the game starting from date 0: at subsequent dates, 
the players need not know each other's past moves, and thus the continuation game 
does not emanate fron1 a single node. However, perfect public equilibria is an obvious 
extension of subga1ne perfection because when players use public strategies their private 
information about their own past actions is irrelevant. In a PPE we can ascribe to each 
player probabilistic beliefs about which node pertains, for each of his information sets in 
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the repeated game. However, these beliefs play no role in the equilibrium: all nodes in 
any one of his information sets lead to the same probability distribution over his payoffs 
(since other players' private information hi,t does not affect their behavior). That is even 
though there is no proper subgame of the repeated game, we can treat each public history 
as if it gives rise to a distinct subgame. 
Along this line, let us to introduce the following definition. 
Definition 6 A strategy si is a public strategy if s~(zt, hi,t) = sHzt, hi,t) for all periods 
t, public histories zt, and private histories h i, t, h i, t. 
The next Proposition shows that if we restrict attention to pure strategies, then 
without any loss of generality we could in fact restrict players to choose strategies which 
only condition on public histories. 
Proposition 11 Given a pure-strategy (Nash) equilibrium where players' strateg'ies may 
depend on the'ir private information, then exists a payoff-equivalent (Nash) equilibrium 
where the players use only public strategies. 
Proof. A pure-strategy equilibrium, has two important characteristics. First, equi-
librium contingent plan is common knowledge: each player perfectly forecasts how the 
opponent \vill play in each period; second, given the public history realization, each pe-
riod play is deterministic and there is no difference between the agent's choice and the 
realization. 
Consider a generic equilibrium strategy s where agents may condition on private 
histories hi,t. W e want to show that the same contingent plan of actions can be defined 
also as an equilibrium strategy s where each player's contingent plan of actions may 
depend only o n public histories zt. 
To see that, start from period zero. Since previous period zero there are no actions 
then we can set for any player i, s~(z0 ) = s~(z0 ) = a~. Consider now the period l actions 
induced by the equilibrium strategy s. Given any public signal realization z0 , the action 
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ai = si (ab, z0 ) is again deterministic and common knowledge in equilibrium. Consider 
the public strategy s. Analogously to period zero, we set si (z0 ) =si (ab, z0 ) =ai exactly 
the same action as the one specifies by s. This for any player i= l, 2 and for any public 
signal realization z0 E Z. Since ab is deterministic then this can always be clone. Along 
the same lines is easy to see that the same reasoning can be clone for any period t and 
for any public history zt. W e define the couple of public strategies s precisely as the one 
obtained with this repeated substitution. 
What remains to show is that if s defines a Nash equilibrium, then also the public 
strategy s defines a Nash equilibrium. The repeated nature of the game implies that 
past actions are not payoff relevant. What mattcrs for each player is the action that thc 
opponent is going to play from now on. 
Forrnally, first note that by definition the public strategics s induce the same con-
tingent plan of actions as the one induced by s. This, in turn, implies that thc induccd 
probability distributions 011 present ancl future histories are the same for the two stratc-
gics a11cl this is what matter for the agents (what is payoff-relevant). In particular, start 
from periocl l with a given realization z0 . Uncler the equilibrium s, each player perfectly 
foreca'3ts what the oppo11ent is going to play this period, so can compute the distribution 
induced by his actio11 011 current period public signal z1. JVIoreover for the same reason 
each player can foreca'3t probability distribution on future public histories. Given that, 
the action ai is a best response, i.e. ai induces an optimal distribution on z1 given the 
perfectly forecasted player's j actio11 a{. Now consider the couple of public strategies s. 
We claim that s is an equilibrium. Indeed assume each player perfectly forecasts future 
actions. Then since the actions, the probability distributions and the agents' payoffs are 
the same as the o n es un der s, then ai = si ( z0 ) must remain a bes t response for any age n t 
i. Applying this reasoni11g to any possible period t and public history zt we have that s 
defines an equilibrium. • 
The intuition of this result is that, for each player it is redundant to co11dition his 
strategy on his past actions because what matters is the forecasted action a11d they are 
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the same under the two types of strategies. 
We have another somehow dual result. If player i chooses to play a public strategy, 
then elementary dynamic programming argument can be used to show that player j 
cannot do any better by choosing a strategy that conditions on his private history as 
well. 
The above result will be important in motivating the recursive specification of the 
repeated moral hazard in Chapter 3 and, given the previous result, \Ve can give an 
alternative definition of perfect public equilibria 
Definition 7 A profile s of repeated-game strategies is a PPE if {i) each si is a public 
strategy and, {ii) the profile of continuation strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium after 
every history zt. 
This last dcfinition has many advantages. First, it can be casily extended to mixcd 
stratcgics cquilibria. Simply changc s~ \vith a~ E A1i leaving unchanged the domain of 
the map. Sccond, this last definition allows to calculate the set of payoff values imposing 
restrictions on agents behavior, simplifying not indifferently the dynamic programming 
techniques used in the characterization. Finally, one of the main reasons for which 
economist are interested in PPE is that the payoffs to such equilibria are stationary. 
That is 
Proposition 12 The set of possible continuation payoffs of PPE starting in period t with 
an arbitrary public and private history is the sa me as the se t of P P E payoffs starting in 
periodO. 
Proof. First wc show that the equilibrium contingent path sustained with public strate-
gies starting from z0 , can be sustained also with public strategies starting from a generi c 
history (zt, h 1,t, h2,t). Since the support and the probability distribution of z is invariant 
over time, then it suffices to ignare what happened during the first t periods. Obviously 
identica! paths imply identica! payoffs, and we bave identical paths for any particular 
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public history. The converse, i.e. that starting from z0 we can sustain as PPE any con-
tingent path that is PPE for the subgame starting from a generic history (zt, h1·t, h2·t), 
is also true. To see it notice that since strategies are public we can ignore the agents' 
private histories. Now, consider an arbitrary element of the set of subgames starting in 
zt with private histories (h1·t, h2·t). Given the strategy profile s, that specifies (the same 
for any private history) actions over the possible public outcome realizations after zt, 
we can construct a ne\v strategy profile starting from z0 by setting s0 (z0 ) = St(zt\zt), 
s1(z1) = St+l ((zt, Zt) \zt) Vzt, .... , and so on, where the notation "(.\zt)" stays for the 
su bse t of branches emanating from zt. This ne\v strategy will induce the same equilibrium 
path as the o ne implied by s after zt, hence the same payoff. • 
Lehrer (1988) [79) showed that the generai idea can be related to the fact that PPE 
can be thought as correlateci equilibrium with perfectly correlateci and exogenous signals 
( callcd public signals). Thosc Con·clated cquilibria give as equilibrium set the convcx hull 
of the Nash equilibria and coordination is possible at the first as well as at the gencric 
pcriod t. 
In contrast, other concepts as the Nash, Bayesian or the Sequential equilibria are not, 
in generai stationary (lack a rccursive structure). This property of stationarity is the 
necessary conclition to apply the recursive analysis of the next Section. 
2.2.2 Self-Generation and Dynamic Programming 
In this subsection we assume again A finite, but, in order to show the flexibility of 
the framework we will analyze the case of mixed strategies and for PPE \Ve refer to 
Definition 7. Let n(z; m) be the conditional probability of the commonly observed ran-
dom variable z with constant finite support Z, given m. Player i's expected payoff be 





B(X) = . 
{ 
x E ~2 j3(m,w) E M x L(Z,X) s.t. } 
xi= (l- 8)ui(m) + 8 LzEZ wi(z)n(z; m) and (m, w) satisfies (2.4) 
L(Z, X) is the set of vectorial functions that map elements of Z into two dimensionai 
vectors in X. Since Z is finite, those functions are always well defined as a finite collection 
of such two dimensionai vectors. 
Let P denote the set of PPE for a given discount factor. It should be clear from 
Proposition 4 that P = B(P). Given any v E B(P) it is easy to construct a PPE with 
payoffs v : choosc a m an d a function w \vi t h rangc in P su eh that w enforces (m, v), an d 
specify that playcrs use m in the first pcriod ancl a PPE with payoffs w(z) occurs. Hence, 
B(P) ç P. Converscly if v E P, then no player wishes to deviate from the first-period 
strategy profile, and the continuation payoffs must (from the perfectness requirement) 
be in P. Hence P ç B(P). The set of PPE is self-generating. 
The next Proposition is the analogous of Proposition 5. Even though the idea is the 
same, we clecided to present the Proposition with his proof for two reasons. First, the 
next Proposition was operationally powerful in proving the Folk Theorem under imperfect 
monitoring in Fudenberg, Levine and Nlaskin (1994)[48]. Second, the proof cannot follow 
the one usecl in Proposition 5, this is a crucial difference between the analysis of perfect 
ancl imperfect monitoring. Since the punishments are used with positive probability 
(actually approximately equal to one) also in equilibrium, then the hardest punishments 
of Abreu (1988) are no longer optimal penai codes. We are forced to use more heavily 
the recursive structurc of the PPE. This explains partially the beauty and the limits of 
our analysis. 
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Proposition 13 If X is self-generating, then X ç P : all payoffs in X are P P E payoffs. 
Pro o f. Fix v E X. W e will show t ha t 3 a strategy pro file a- which yields v as a PPE 
payoff. Similarly to the proof in Proposition 5, since X ç B(X), then 3 an action profile 
ma and a map w0 that generates v and satisfies (2.4). Set a-0 = m 0 and for each period 
zero outcome z0 set v1 = w0(z0). Since v1 E X ç B(X) then there is an action profile m 1 
and a map w1 : Z----+ X that generates payoff v1. Set a- 1(z0 ) = m1(wo(zo)) and for each 
sequence z0, z1 we have v2 = w1(w0(z0))(zl) E X, and so on. The constructed strategies 
yield payoff v if there are no deviations and they have been constructed so that there is 
no history zt where a player can gain by deviating once and conforming thereafter. By 
the trivial adaptation of unimprovability to this stochastic case the constructed strategy 
is a PPE. • 
Remark 2 As remarked above, this argument is essentially that of dynamic progra7n-
ming, applied to games where the physical situation is me1noriless, but the past matters 
beca·use i t infiuences the opponents' play. N o ti ce that w e h ave constructed the sequence 
oj actions and junctions with the TCCUrsion: mt(zt) = m(vt) and Wt(zt)(zt) = w(vt)(zt) 
Hence the :.·state" is summarized by the current target payoff v. Associated with each 
period payoff vector Vt we have a period t + l action for each player, and a rule that 
specifies the continuation payoffs as a function of this period 's realized outcome. This 
observation links this essentially theoretical analysis to the recursive contractual approach 
of Spear and Srivastava {1987)[126}. 
In case of pure strategies, following closely the arguments In Subsection 2.1.3, is 
possible to show the results of Proposition lO for our finite support Z case. Unfortunately 
the case with mixed strategies is not so trivial and we leave the study for future research. 
The classica! moral hazard model with one principal and one agent is an important 
example of a game with imperfect monitoring on one side. One of the benefits of the 
recent overlap of contract theory and repeated garnes has been a growing understanding 
of the relationship between what can be accomplished by implicit and explicit (legai) 
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accordingly, we do not summarize the results of the various tests here). First, it is highly 
probable that none of the models comes dose to capturing the real strategie interaction 
that is far more complicated, in important ways, that any of the models tested. A second 
reservation is that the collusive theories tested are quite naive from a conceptual point of 
view, ignoring renegotiation, coalition formation, and other considerations of equilibrium 
refinement. In our opinion, the pure theory of implicit collusion is at such a primitive 
stage that it is in no shape to be tested. 
Stili, we fill that there is a lot to be learned from studying collusion in specific in-
dustries, keeping in mind an assortment of questions provoked by modern theory. An 
exciting example of what can result is Levenstein's (1989)(80] work on the bromine indus-
try in the USA and Germany from 1880 until1914. By analyzing the internai documents 
of the Dow Chemical Company and its correspondence with other American and German 
producers, Levenstein gives us an extraorclinary picture of the revolution of competition 
ancl collusion among the oligopolists as they gained experience, lcarned about their ri-
vals, and faced changing market conditions. Other fascinating examples of self-enforcing 
contracts in the economie history literature include Greif (1989)[56] on reputation arnong 
medieval 1viediterranean traders, and Iviilgrom, North, ancl Weingast (1990)[92] on the 
role of the Law Nlerchant and the Champagne fairs in Europe in the middle ages. 
38 
Chapter 3 
Contractual Approach: Recursive 
Contracts 
In this Chapter we adapt the concepts presented in Chapter 2 and we show how recursive 
techniqucs can be used to characterize some apparently complicate dynamic economie 
problems. To introduce the approach we start by quoting Hart and Holmstrom (1987)(60]: 
'' The mai n simplification t ha t characterize t be methodology of contract the-
ory is to substitute an equilibrium problem with a ma..ximization one. This 
simplification is based on the assumption that parties at some initial date 
(say, zero) design a Pareto optimal (for them) long-term contract. Optimal-
ity is not to be understood in a first-best sense, but rather in constrained or 
second-best one. Indeed, informational and other restrictions that force the 
contract to be second-best are at the heart of the analysis; without them, 
o ne would quickly be back in the standard Arrow-Debreu paradigm w h ere 
contractual form is inessential. Because informational constraints will play 
a particular and important role in the ensuing discussion, let us note right 
away that throughout we will restrict attention to cases in which informational 
asymmetries arise only subsequent to contracting. In the typicallanguage of 
the literature, we will not consider adverse selection models [ ... ) ." 
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In this chapter we characterize second-best (or constrained Pareto optimal) contracts. 
1\!Ioreover, we focus on the intertemporal aspects of the contractual problems. In par-
ticular, we show that under some conditions an infinite horizon sequential contractual 
problem can be reconducted to a sequence of ( constrained) Pareto optimal problems. 
Finally we retain also the last sentence of Hart and Holmstrom: our analysis is restricted 
to models where the information is complete. Hart and Holmstrom continue by saying: 
"The design of a Pareto optimal contract proceeds by maximizing o ne par-
ty's expected utility subject to the other party (or parties) receiving a min-
imum (reservation) expected utility level. Which party's level is taken as a 
constraint do es no t usually matter, because most analyses are parti al equi-
librium. When there is perfect competition ex ante, this reservation utility 
can be interpreted as that party's date-zero opportunity cost determined in 
the date-zero market for contracts. When ex ante competition is imperfect, 
the parties will presumably bargain over the ex-ante surplus from the rela-
tionship, and so the reservation expected utility levels become endogenous 
[ ... ]." 
In this chapter- as in most of the literature - we assume the principal has the whole 
bargaining power and makes a take-or-leave-it offer to the agent. However, first, the 
model presented in Chapter 5 is an example where taking the principallevel of profits as 
a constraint is more natura! and analytically convenient than the other case. Second, the 
endogeneity of the bargaining power is one of the driving forces of the results in Chapter 
4. 
During this decade, recursive contracts were developed to solve one of the most im-
portant problems in dynamic economies: insurance. This is the argument of the first two 
sections. In Section l we study ways to deliver consumption smoothing and insurance 
in face of commitment problems under perfect monitoring. In Section 2 we deal with 
imperfect monitoring models. Here \ve restrict our analysis to hidden action under com-
plete information (or principal-agent) models so we do no t analyze in particular problems 
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across t ime. Moreover, in order t o eliminate aggregate uncertainty, we assume the en-
dowments of the two agents are perfectly negatively correlateci. Whenever the agent 
receives y(t) the principal receives l- y(t). 
We introduce the following information structure. A complete public history of en-
dowments is an infinite sequence h= (y(O), y(l), y(2), ....... ), with y (t) E Y = [0, l]. All 
the possible complete histories h form the set of events n. A partial history ht is a finite 
sequence of endowments (y(O), y(l), y(2), .... , y(t- l)). The a-algebra of events in n is 
F = ®:o Bt where Bt = B is the family of Borelians of Y. The information evolves 
according to the filtration F 0 c F 1 c F 2 C ... C Ft C ... , where Ft is the a-algebra 
induced by the partial histories ht and Fo = {0, n} is the trivial a-algebra2. 
The m o del can be seen as a repeated game between two players ( the principal as 
player l and the agent as player 2). At each time t the realization of y(t) become 
known to both of them. At that point each of tbc two playcrs simultaneously transfer a 
nonnegative amount of his current endo\vrnent to the othcr individuai. Thus a periocl-t 
"full" history of this dynamic game is the vector of y( t) realizations an d past transfers 
T R =(T R1 , T R2 ) made by the agents 
(y(O), T R(O), y(l), T R(l), ...... ,T R(t- 1), y(t)). 
A strategy for an agent specifies his action ( transfer) after each possible full history; 
thus, in period t, agent i's strategy is a mapping from possible histories into transfer 
amounts. A subgame perfect equilibrium specifies a strategy for each agent such that 
player's action (that is, choice of transfer amounts) at a given history is optimal given 
the other player's strategy. Analogously a subgame perfect allocation is the allocation 
induced by a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Now consider a generic (thus, not necessary an equilibrium one) transfer scheme. 
Once i t is specified, each contingent plan T R induces an allocation {w( t), l - w( t)} :o 
2 ìvlathematically, :Ft is generateci by all the rcctangles II~0 Bi, where Bi E Band Bi= Y fori 2: t. 
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which is a stochastic vector process where w( t) is Ft+1-measurable3 and we have denoted 
w(t) = y(t) + TR1(t)- TR2(t). Thus, all those allocations can be reproduced with a 
contract, \vhere 
Definition 8 A contractW is a sequence {wt(h)}:,0 , wherewt: n---* [0,1] is aFt+l-
measurable function, and the prescription that at each period t and for any endowment 
realization y( t), the agent must turn aver his ti me-t endowment y( t) to the principal who 
then return wt(h) to the agent. 
The interpretation is that wt(h) = wt(ht+l )"1 is the value of the transfer w( t) that 
will be chosen in period t if the partial history of shocks observed in period O through t 
is ht+l. Restricted in this way the prescription looses the importance, this is consistent 
with our focus \vhich emphasizes the allocation induced by a contract. 
At tirnc zero and only at tin1e zero, prcvious thc random variable y(O) is realizcd, wc 
have the following trec-stcp game. In stcp l the principal offers (with a take-or-lcave-
it offer) a contract to the agcnt. In step two (again before y(O) realization) the agent 
accepts or rcject the contract. In step 3 the two agents start playing the agreed transfer 
schen1e. 
\Ve introduce a probability measure 11 on the measurable space (n, F) and we assume: 
(Al) The agent has preferences over consumption streams that are ordered by 
00 
E L 8tu(w(t)), 8 E (0, l) (3.1) 
t=O 
with u(.) increasing and strictly concave. 
(A2) The principal's payoff depends on the net return: l - w(t), and his lifetime 
3Indeed, once the contract is specified the transfers can be rewritten as a function of ht+l alone, so, 
since measurability is maintained by composition, tv(t) is Ft+rmeasurable. 
'
1Note that wt(h) is Ft+1-measurable means that Wt is a measurable function of the first t + l 
arguments of h, so we write indifferently wt(h) or wt(ht+I ). 
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preferences are given by 
00 
E L 8t B (l - w( t)) , 8 E (0, l) (3.2) 
t=O 
with B(.) increasing and concave. 
To clarify notation consider, for example, the agent-borrower intertemporal prefer-
ences. Given a contract W and an history h we have 
00 
L 8tu (wt (h)). 
t=O 
Contract are evaluated according to expected values 
s = 0,1,2, ..... , 
where, for a randorn variablc X, we write E [./Y l Fs] = Es [X] to denote the expected 
value conditional on thc information availablc at thc beginning of the period s (i.e. 
when the finite history h5 is knovvn). Note that at the beginning of period O, only the 
unconditional mean E [X) = E 0 [X) is a number. For s = l, 2, ... we bave Fs-measurable 
randorn variables, i.e. functions of h 5 • This justifies the notation 
I t is easy t o see t ha t 
Now we are ready to describe Pareto optimal or first-best contracts. They are evalu-
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ated at the beginning of period O according to 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
Proposition 14 Given {A1}-{A2}, a contract W is first-best if and only ifwt (h)= w 
for every t and almost surely for every h E n. 
Proof. First we show that every first best contract W induces an allocation that is 
time and history invariant. Considera generic first best contract W with {wt(h)}:o and 
consider the allocation w = 2:::0 (1 - 8)8tE [wt(h)]. Then, from the concavity of u(.) 
and B(.) and using Jensen's Inequality we have 
l 00 00 
(1-8)u(w) > L 8tu (E [wt (h)]) 2 L 8tE [u (wt (h))]= U(W) (3.5) 
t=O t=O 
l 00 
(l-b')B(l-w) > L 8t B (E [l- Wt (h)]) ~ B(W), (3.6) 
t=O 
moreover, note that sin ce {w t (h)} :o is first-best then those inequalities must be equalities. 
But then from the strict concavity of u(.) this implies that actually wt(h) =w for every 
t and almost surely for every h E n. 
To see this last statement note that from the equality of (3.5), in particular we 
have u (w) = 2:::0 (1- 8)8tu (E [wt (h)]). This equality implies that for any t we must 
have E [wt (h)] = w. Indeed, if for some t we have, say E [wt (h)] > w, then from 
w = 2:::0 (1 - 8)8tE [wt(h)] there must be some t' for which E [wt' (h)] > w. But w 
can be seen as a convex combination of such expected values with weights (l - 8)8t > O 
(2:::0 (1 - 8)8t = l) and E [wt(h)] =/= E [wt'(h)]. The strict concavity of u(.) implies 
u (w) > 2:::0 (1 - 8)8tu (E [w t (h)]), a contradiction. That cannot exist a set A c n 
of positive measure 1-1(A) such that, say wt(h) > w for every h E A, can be shown in 
45 
a similar way. Indeed if this were true, then from w = E [w t (h)] t h ere should exists 
a set B c n of positive measure J-L(B) such that wt(h') < w for every h' E B. From 
the linearity of the expected operator we can construct the convex combination w = 
J-L(A)wA +J-L(B)wB+J-L (n- (A U B)) w, where WA =E [wt(h) l h E A] and WB is similarly 
defined, then from the strict concavity of u(.) and WA =f. w8 , using Jensen's inequality 
we have 
a contradiction. 
Conversely we show that a contract W such that wt(h) =w for every t almost surely 
for every h is first best. This amounts to show that cannot cxist a contract W such that: 
(i) U(W) 2:: (I~<5) 1L (w), B(W) 2:: (I~c5)B (l- w) and (ii) at least one of the inequalities 
in (i) is strict. 
First, wc usc thc fact that both u(.) ancl B(.) are incrcasing. Consider a generic 
contract W such that gives, say 2:::0(1- b)btE [wt(h)] > w. This contract cannot satisfy 
requircment (i) because (I~c5)u(w) > 2::0 btE[u(wt(h))] = U(W). For contracts such 
that 2:::0 (1 - b)btE [wt(h)] < w the requirement (i) cannot be satisfied because now 
is the principal that stays strictly better un der the ( almost surely) constant allocation 
contract W. So the only possible contracts that could Pareto dominate W must be 
such that w= 2::0(1- b)btE [wt(h)]. But note that (3.5)-(3.6) have to be true for any 
{wt(h)}:,0 such that w= 2::0(1- b)btE [wt(h)], indepenclently wether it is first best 
or no t, so (ii) cannot be satisfied by su eh allocations an d we h ave proved our statement. 
vVhether contracts with w = l or w = O can be first-best or not depends on the limit 
conditions on u(.) and B(.), but in principle without extreme Inada conditions they could 
be first best. • 
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3.1.2 Second-Best Insurance Contracts 
It is easy to see that if both the principal and the agent can commi t in period zero to an 
infinite horizon contract, it will be possible to implementa first-best allocation. However, 
in many economie problems this is not possible. The objective of the present section is 
to study what happens if we relax the assumption of full commitment. 
For that we specify further the probability space without looking for minimal condi-
tions: 
(A3) There are only a finite number of possible endowment realizations, i.e. 
Vt 2: O. 
(A4) The probability measure J-L on the measurable space (D, F) is summarized by 
the invariant discrete probability distribution over y(t) 
Pi = J-L(h E D l y(t) = Yi) >O, i= {l, 2, ... N} Vt 2: O. 
To reduce notational complexity we denote W(ht) the continuation of contract W 
after history ht. The associateci transfer scheme is {wt+n(h\ht)}~=O' where Wt+n(h\ht) = 
Wt+n(ht+l+n\ht) is the ht-section of Wt+n(h). Finally, denote B (W(ht)) and U (W(ht)) 
respectively the principal and agent's actual utilities induced by W(ht) 5 . Note that, under 
assumptions (A3)-(A4), for any given history ht, U (W(ht)) can be defined recursively 
as follows 
(3.7) 
Commitment Assumption (C) Neither the borrower nor the planner are committed 
5 For example 
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to honor their promises. Nforeover, if some agent walks away from the contract then he 
must live in autarky henceforth. 
Under the commitment assumption (C) both agents are free to walk away from their 
arrangement at any time. They must be induced not to do it by the structure of the 
transfer contract. Thus the model is of two-sided lack of commitment, and any feasible 
contract must be self-enforcing. The assumption of autarky punishment is in the tradition 
of the recursive contracts literature. In Proposition 15 we will show that, since both 
agents can always guarantee to themselves the autarky payoff, then in the terminology 
of Chapter 2, autarky can be seen as the severest punishment payoff. For the borrower, 
the ex-ante value associate with consuming the endowment stream, (autarky value), is 
CX) 00 l 
Vaut =E L 8tu (y (t))= E L 08 U (y (t+ s)) = l_ 
0
E [u (y(t))], (3.8) 
t=O s=O 
Sirnilarly, thc planncr autarky utility valuc is 
CX) 
Baut =E L 8tB (l- y (t)). (3.9) 
l=O 
\Vhcn the agent obscrves his current peri od endowment y( t), h e can guarantee himself a 
present value utility of u(y(t)) + 8vaut by consuming his own endowment. Thus, for any 
fLxed period t history h t of past output realizations, the planner must design W such that 
the contingent plan offers to the agent-borrower more than the amount u(y(t)) + OVaut 
for every period t output realization y( t). Given the past history h t, if we denote the 
realized y( t) by Yi, the contract must satisfy 
(3.10) 
Equation (3.10) is called the participation constraint for thc agent. Thc corresponding 
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participation constraint for the principal is 
(3.11) 
Definition 9 Un der (C), a contraci is sai d to be sustainable (or self-enforcing) 
after history ht if it satisfies {3.10} and {3.11} for any history ht+n n 2: O that follows 
h t {i. e. ht+n\ht) and Vi. Ifa contraci is sustainable after h0 we simply say it is sustainable 
{or self-enforcing). 
Note that if W is self-enforcing, then its continuation W(ht) is self-enforcing after 
history h t. Denote with S the set of self-enforcing contracts and note that the right hand 
sicle (RHS) of conditions (3.10)(3.11) does not depend on time and history6 • The next 
Proposition links our analysis to the terminology of Chapter 2. 
Proposition 15 A contract W induces a S'ubgame perfect allocation if and only if satis-
fies {3.1 O} and {3.11} for any history h t, i. e. if and only if W E S. 
Proof. Suppose W satisfies (3.10) and (3.11) in any history ht. Recall the game theo-
retical formulation before Definition 8 and consider the following trigger strategies. Each 
agent i's strategy is summarized as follow: if, until history h t, agent j i= i followed the 
transfer scheme that induces the allocation implied by W, then agent i continues to fol-
low this transfer path, otherwise he will switch to autarky (i.e. T Ri =O, forever). These 
strategies define a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
On the other hand, from the one-deviation property, any subgame perfect transfer 
scheme must induce and allocation that satisfy (3.10) and (3.11), otherwise switching to 
autarky will be a profitable deviation. • 
One important result is the convexity of the set of self-enforcing contracts. This 
important property is, in generai, not satisfied by imperfect monitoring models. 
6 This is because they are forward looking, y(t) is i.i.d. and the horizon is infinite. 
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Lemma l Under {A1}-(A4) and (C}, considera generic history ht. The set of con-
tracts that are self-enforcing after history h t, form a convex set, i. e. S is convex. 
Proof. Consider two contracts W and W' that are self-enforcing after history ht . Define 
the convex combination as the contract wa = { wf(ht+l) }:0 where for each history h t+ l, 
wf(ht+l) = awt(ht+l) +(l- a)w~(ht+l ). Since both W and W' satisfy (3.10) and (3.11) 
for any ht+n follo\ving history ht by the concavity of u(.) and B(.) also wa does, so it is 
self-enforcing after history h t. • 
As we said, in contract literature, economists are not interested in allocations that 
are not constrained efficient. Along this line we introduce some important concepts. 
Definition 10 A self-enforcing contract is said to be second-best if there is no other 
self-enjoTcing contTact which ojjeTs both paTties at least as much expected utility and one 
paTty stTictly moTe. 
Definition 11 UndeT {A1}-(A4) and (C}, far any history ht and any value of the 
agent 's utility v, the Pareto frontier, is given by: 
Pt(v; ht) = sup B (W(ht)) 
WES 
(3.12) 
.sub: U (W(ht)) ~v. 
\Ve conclude this Subsection with stating some important properties of the value 
function Pt(v; ht). 
Proposition 16 Pt(v; ht) is nonincreasing and concave in v. 
Pro o f. That Pt (.; . ) is nonincreasing in v is easy from the fact t ha t the constraint set 
get no t bigger. 
From Lemma l and (A3)-(A4), the program (3.12) clefincs a concave problem. So 
the value function Pt (.; . ) is concave in v. • 
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3.1.3 Continuation Utility as a Sufficient Statistic 
The sequential approach is proved to be valuable, but appears to be complicate because 
the dimension of ht is large and grows rapidly with t. We try to adapt the concepts 
developed in Chapter 2 to simplify our analysis. The goal is to represent the sequence of 




By iterating g(., .) t times, one obtains 
v t = f (va; y (O) , y ( l) , .... , y (t - l)) . 
Tbus, Vt sumrnarizes bistories of endowments. Now we bave the following Proposition 
tbat sbows one of tbe most important properties of second-best contracts. vVe call it 
sequential efficiency and we will see tbat optimal contracts under imperfect monitoring 
bave a similar property. 
Proposition 17 Under {A1}-(A4), a second-best contract satisfies (3.12} after any 
history h t. 
Proof. Suppose not. So consider a second-best contract W which, after history ht 
implies an expected discounted utility for the agent equal to v = U (W(ht)) and suppose 
there exists another contract W' (not necessary optimal) such that after bistory ht gives 
more than Pt (v; h t) with a self-enforcing contract and guarantees utility v to tbe agent. 
Note tbat, since the second-best contract W is, in particular, self-enforcing tben this is 
the only possibility for the negation staternent. Tben we can, at time zero, replace the 
originai contract W with a contract t ha t follows W' only after the history h t, an d follows 
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W otherwise. This new contract will be self-enforcing and gives to the agent the same 
utility as W and to the principal some more, then W could not be optimal. • 
The previous Proposition means that a second best contract cannot be dominateci 
after any history h t. But stili we have the unpleasant feature of history and time de-
pendence in the definition of the Pareto frontier. The next Proposition shows that the 
problem is, in fact, stationary. 
Proposition 18 Suppose 3 a second best contract W* and consider a generic history 
ht with associated agent's expected continuation utility U (W*(ht)). The principal's con-
tinuation payoff B (W* (h t)) implied by the optimal contrae t W* ca n be obtained by a 
new second best contract W0 starting at time zero where the agent is required to receive 
Proof. The first part of the proof is by construction. Given W* define W 0 as follows. 
Considcr the continuation 
and sct wg(yi) = w;(ht,yi\ht) 'v'i; w?(yi,Yi) = w;+1(ht,yi,Yi\ht) 'v'i,j; and so on. Can 
be seen, from the stationarity of the RHS of tbe self-enforcing constraints, tbat W 0 is self-
enforcing. rvroreover since y( t) is i.i.d. and by the stationary form of agent 's preferences 
we bave U (W0 ) = U (W*(ht)) =v. We bave sbown tbat W0 is self-enforcing and gives 
t be age n t a t least the required utility v. 
Wbat ren1ains to show is tbat W 0 is a second-best contract from tbe perspective of 
time zero, i.e. 
sup B (W) 
WES 
sub U(W) ~v. 
Tbis can be sbown by contradiction. Suppose tbcre exist a self-enforcing contract W' E S 
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such that B (W') > B (W0 ) and that U (W) ~v. Denote 
the implied contingent plan. Now use w' to construct the following new after history 
h t continuation of the initial second-best contract W*, in a way similar to the one used 
in the first part of the proof. Set: w;*(ht,yi\ht) = w~(Yi) Vi; w;~ 1 (ht,yi,Yi\ht) = 
w~(yi,Yi) Vi,j; and so on. This new continuation W**(ht) gives, after history ht, at least 
the required continuation utility v t o the agent, is self-enforcing after history h t, and 
guarantees to the principal an utility B (W**(ht)) > B (W*(ht)). But this contradicts 
Proposition 17, so W 0 must be second-best. • 
Broadly speaking, Proposition 18 says the planner is facing in any period the same 
problem, pararnetrized by v. Consider the problem at period zero. The planner has to 
sol ve: 
P(v0 ) = sup B (W) 
WES 
sub U(W) ~va. 
Using the additive separability of preferences as in (3. 7) we can rewrite the problem 
as 
P(vo) sup LPi [B (1- wo(Yi)) + 6B (W(yi))] 
WES . 
l 
sub LPi [u (wo(Yi)) + 6U (W(yi))] ~va. 
Proposition 17 allows us to rewrite the problem as 
P(vo) sup LPi [B (l- wo(Yi)) + 6P1(vi; Yi)] 
WES . 
l 
sub L Pi [u ( wo(Yi)) + 6vi] 2:: va. 
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where vi= U (W(yi)). Finally, Proposition 18 implies we can equivalently write P1 (vi; Yi) = 
P( vi). Thus, we can use as a state variable Vt the promised discounted future value an d 
state the following proposition. 
Proposition 19 Let P( v) the expected present value ofthe "profit stream" {l- w(t)}:o 
for a planner who delivers value v in the opti mal way. The optimum value P( v) obeys to 
the functional equation 
N 
P( v)= sup {wi,vi};~ 1 LPi [B(l- wi) + 8P (vi)] 
i= l 
N 
sub: L Pi [u( wi) +Dvi] 2:: v 
i= l 
i= l, 2, ... N 
: B(l- wi) + 8P(vi) 2:: B(l- Yi) + 8Baut i= l, 2, ... N 





Constraint (3.14) is called the "promising keeping" constraint requiring t ha t a t least 
the promised value v be delivered. Constraints (3.15) and (3.16), one for each i, are 
the self-enforcing constraints. The characterization shows that we can think about the 
construction of efficient self-enforcing contracts using the following mechanical metaphor. 
The social planner enters period t having promised agent a certain amount of ex-ante 
utility v. Taking this promise as given in form of (3.14), the planner seeks to maximize the 
amount of ex-ante utility he receives. The planner determines how much consumption to 
give or to take from the agent and how much future utility to promise him, contingent 
on each state of the world. He must take into account the self-enforcing constraint (3.15) 
that capture his inability to force the agent to give up consumption beyond threatening 
him with future autarky. Finally, the agent will not accept any arrangement that violate 
(3.16), because if (3.16) is not satisfied, then the planner will profitably walk away from 
the contract. 
Note that for this approach two ingredients appear to be thc heart of our analy-
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sis. First, sequential efficiency guarantees we can wor k o n the Pareto frontier. Second, 
Abreu's simple strategies approach guarantees the optimal punishment are independent 
from the history. So, that at any date and state, we are working always on the same 
Pareto frontier. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1997)(5] and our application of Chapter 
5 are examples that the approach can be easily extended to the case where the Pareto 
frontier is changing exogenously. When the Pareto frontier depends on an endogenous 
variable, like in models with growth, at any period t the principal must choose simulta-
neously the next peri od Pareto frontier an d the point o n i t. This is the mai n challenge 
for the future research in recursive contracts. 
Going back to our model, note that Proposition 16 shows both that the constraint 
set (3.14)-(3.15)(3.16) is convex and that the objective function is concave, thus (3.13), 
(3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) define a concave problem. In what follows we use a differentiable 
approach t o characterize further an optimal contract 7 . 
Consider a second-best contract which provides the agent-borrower with utility equal 
to v. The ma..,'Cimization problem makes clear that we can divide the possible states of the 
word in period t, at least into three groups. States 181 in which only constraint (3.15) 
binds, states 182 in which only constraint (3.16) binds, and states JNB in which neither 
constraint (3.15) nor (3.16) binds8 . To complete the analysis we have 
Proposition 20 If there exists some self-enforcing contraci that is non-autarchie then 
cannot be that both {3.15) and {3.16) are binding, i. e. ! 81 n ! 82 = 0. 
Proof. If (3.15) is binding then wi :::; Yi because vi ~ Vaut· If (3.16) is binding then 
wi ~ Yi because P( vi) ~ E aut· It follows that if both (3.15) and (3.16) are binding then 
Wi = Yi, Vi = Vaut, and P(vi) = Baut· But this means that P(vaut) = Baut which is 
impossible as long as there exists some self-enforcing contract that is non-autarchie. • 
7 \Ve motivate our informai analysis recalling that concave functions are almost evcrywhere differen-
tiable in the inerior of their domain (Rockafeller (1975) [110]). 
8 For a constraint be binding we mean the associateci multiplier is strictly positive. 
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Assign multipliers /, /\ and T/i respectively to constraints (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) 
and assume u(.) and B(.) are differentiable. The Kuhn-Thcker conditions for an interior 
solution yield9 : 
(3.17) 
moreover, from the envelope theorem we ha ve 
1 =-P'( v). (3.18) 
For any given v, we have three possible results. (i) For the states in JNB consumption is 
independent from the endowment, and continuation utilities are not changed for neither 
consumer. For all the i that are in this set we bave the first best feature of constant 
transfer wi =w Vi E JN 8 . Indeed the Inarginal utilities ratio lJ~(~~:~i) = /, is constant 
with ! = !(v) as a "temporary Pareto weight". From the concavity of B(.) and the 
strict concavity of u(.) we bave that the ration is strictly increasing in wi, so in order to 
ha ve a constant ratio, wi must be constant for any i in JN 8 . (ii) In states ! 81 , where 
only the participation constraint of the agent is binding, the contract raises both actual 
consun1ption and promise future utility of the agent to induce him to surrender some of 
bis endo\vment t o the principal. Sin ce P( v) is decreasing in v, the principal see reduced 
both his current consumption and his promised utility. (iii) In states 182 , where only the 
participation of the principal is binding the situation is symmetric to the previous one. 
The principal sees increased both actual and future utility, and the agent's actual and 
future utility decrease. The agent accepts the reduction in promised utility because his 
current endowment Yi is so low that he prefers the contract to consuming today Yi and 
9 \Ve remark that \vith the appropriate Inada conditions 
lim u'(w) = lim B'(l- w)= oo 
w-+0 w-+l 
interiority is guaranteed. 
56 
going from tomorrow on in autarky. 
Given v, case (i) prevails in intermediate levels of y(t)'s, (ii) in high y(t) states, 
and the (iii) in low y(t) states. The optimal contract expresses wi and Vi as a non 
decreasing function of Yi, with the properties that there are two numbers y_( v) ~ y( v) 
each increasing function of v, such that wi an d Vi are each constant for Yi E (y_( v), y( v)) 
and increasing in Yi otherwise. Thus, given v, the agents can be insured only over interior 
values Yi E (y_(v), y(v)). 
To prove the next Proposition we must follow more closely Kocherlakota (1996) [73) 
who studied an example of the preceding model in which there are two identica! risk 
adverse agents. So we assume (Al)-(A3) and 
(A5) The planner utility function is E(.) = u(.) where u(.) is a continuous function 
de fin cd as in ( A3). The princi p al will be now called "age n t 2". 
Kocherlakota assumecl each agent has prefcrences, endowments and autarky utility 
possibilities described above. Our definitions of first-best, self-enforcing, Pareto frontier 
ancl Propositions 15 ancl 17 trivially apply to this model. 
As wc clid, Kocherlakota formulateci the contracting problem as a clynamic program, 
w bere t be state of the system is the value v assigned to agent l. Le t P( v) now clenote 
the expected discountecl utility of agent 2 when agent l is awarded promised utility v. 




SUPw,v' LPi [u(1- w( v, Yi)) + 8P (v'(v, Yi))] 
i= l 
N 
LPi [u(w(v, Yi)) + 8v'(v, Yi)] 2: v 
i=l 




u(l- w( v, Yi)) + 8P(v'(v, Yi)) 2: u(l- Yi) + 8vaut i= l, 2, ... N (3.22) 
v' (v, Yi) E [vaut, v] . (3.23) 
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Here (3.20) is the promise keeping constraint; (3.21) an d (3.22) are respectively the 
participation constraints for agent l and 2. Constraint (3.23) is simply requiring the value 
function belong to his domain. For this model Kocherlakota could prove the existence of 
a nondegenerate limiting distribution. However, first we need an important lemma. 
Lemma 2 The value function P(.) is continuous, strictly concave and, given Yi the poli-
ci es w (v, Yi), v' (v, Yi) are conti n uous functions o f v. 
Proof. First, note that the associateci operator satisfies the Blackwell's sufficient condi-
tions for a contraction mapping. Nionotonicity is easy because the objective function is 
higher and the constraint (3.22) is not more stringent. Discounting is trivial by similar 
reasons. To see that the operator maps continuous functions into continuous functions 
wc can usc the Theorem of the ma..ximuin and note that the constraint set correspondence 
is continuous if P(.) is continuous. To sce t ha t the opcrator Inaps concave functions into 
strictly concave functions note that the constraint se t is convex an d u(.) in the objective 
function is strictly concave from (Al) an d ( A5). 
Finally, sin ce P(.) is continuous, the Theorem of the maximum guarantees w( v, yi) 
and v'(v, Yi) to be upper semicontinuous, the strict concavity implies they are single 
valued, so they Inust be continuous. • 
\Vith this result we can conclude our analysis of the model with the following Propo-
sition due to l(ocherlakota (1996)(73]. 
Proposition 21 Assume {A1} and {A3}-{A5}. Suppose there is no self-enforcingfirst-
best contraci and fix an initial continuation utility v0 . Then, as t goes to infinity, Pr( Vt l 
va) converges weakly to the same non-degenerate limiting distribution for all va E [vaut, v] . 
Proof. P(.) is continuous and from the symmetry of the problem, P(.) maps [vaut, v] 
into itself; hence from the Brower's fixed point Theoren1 there exists a fixed point v* such 
that P( v*) = v*. Thus, there is a second-best contract that provi cles both agents with the 
same level of utility. First note that in period one if v* = v0 thc set of indices i for which 
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the self-enforcing constraint of either agent is binding are both non empty. Suppose not 
then if one of the two set is empty, then by symmetry also the other agent set is empty, 
but this is not possible because we suppose there is no first-best self-enforcing contract. 
W e want t o prove that starting from v0 = V aut, t h ere is some t su eh t ha t V t 2 v* with 
positive probability. Defìne the function U(v) = Maxiv'(v,yi)· Start with an arbitrary 
v0 < v*. W e know t ha t if the set if indices i for which the agent l 's self-enforcing constraint 
is binding is nonempty when v0 = Vaut, then there will be always some index for which the 
constraint is binding for any v0 E (V aut, v*); because t h ere is a non-autarky self-enforcing 
contract, if Vo = V aut, t h ere exists some i su eh t ha t v' (v, Yi) > V aut. Hence, U (va) > va for 
all va E (vaut, v*). Define the sequence {rn}~=l recursively by the formula T n= U(rn-d 
and ra = v0 . For any initiallevelless than v* there should be some index i for which the 
agent l 's self-enforcing constraint is binding, so T n > T n-l for any Tn-1 < v*. 
Suppose there does not exists any n such that rn > v*. Then, { r n} ~=l is a strictly 
increasing sequence t ha t is bounded above by v*, so T 71 converges to some r* :::; v*. Since 
from a trivial application of the theore1n of ma.ximum U(.) is continuous, this limi t must 
satisfy U(r*) = r*. Then either r* =v* or we have a contradiction because U(v) >v for 
any v< v*. 
Thus it is possible to start at v0 = Vaut and find a t such that the probability that 
Vt is at least v* is a positive value, say c. Similarly we can find T such that if va = v, 
Pr( vT :::; v* l v0 = v) 2 c. The utility :Niarkov process satisfìes Assumption 12.1 of Stokey 
and Lucas (1989)[127] and therefore Theorem 12.12 of Stokey and Lucas applies to it. 
Note that the limiting distribution of utility must be symmetric. Hence, it can only 
be generateci if i t places all mass on v* such that P( v*) = v*; however, both agents's 
self-enforcing constraints bind with positive probability when v0 = v*(or it \vould be the 
first bes t), an d so a distribution with mass on v* cannot be a stochastic steady state. 
Hence, the steady state cross-section distribution of utility is not degenerate in a second 
best contract. • 
It is immediate from Proposition 21 that the limiting joint distribution of agents' 
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A seminai work is Thomas and Worral (1988) [129] who analyze a labor marked ap-
plication of our model with risk neutral principal. 
The model of one-sided lack of commitment is frequently used to study problems 
of sovereign debt. See for example Bullow and Rogoff (1989)[25][26], Fernandez and 
Rosenthal (1990)[43] and Rosenthal (1991)[114]. 
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1997)[5] and Thomas and Worral (1994)[130] extend 
the analysis of this section t o the case w h ere the "stage game" is more complicate. In 
the first paper the planner is a bank that can choose the firm's level of working capitai. 
Thomas and Worrai [130] applied a model simiiar to [5] to study foreign direct investment 
probiem in international trade. 
Atkeson (1991)[10] anaiyzes a model of sovereign debt with imperfect monitoring 
where the Iencler cannot observe wether the borrower consume or invests borrowed founds. 
A Lagrangian method Consider equation (4.14). From (3.18) wc havc the pcriod t 
muitiplier ì = !(V t) as a function of the state variabie V t. Suppose instead we can write 
dircctly the luw of motion for {, thcn for any pcriod t, we can rewrite (4.14) as 
and have the same interpretation as before. This is the essence of the recursive approach 
proposed by Marcet and 1\!Iarimon (1992-1994)[85](86]. In summary, Marcet and Marimon 
rearrange the Lagrangian of the (infinite dimensionai) sequential problem to obtain a 
recursive determination of ìt as a function of past multipliers. Obviously, if it works, the 
method gives the same solutions as the ones given by the method analyzed in this thesis. 
However, in economics, many infinite dimensionai probiems are defined in the space of 
bounded sequences (l00 ) and it is well know that the duai of zoo is not l1. The main 
challenge of this approach is thus to find conditions that eliminate the purely additive 
component in the Iinear functionai that define the multipiiers (see Dechert (1982) [37] 
an d Rustichini (1998) [117]). Finally, i t is important to emphasize an advantage of this 
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approach. The introduction of a new endogenous state variables, as in growth models, 
is not a problem for l\!Iarcet and Marimon's approach (as long as the multipliers are well 
defined). 
3.2 lmperfect Monitoring and the Hidden-Action Moral 
Hazard Problem 
If the motivation for studying default models were principally a positive one, when 
there are rnonitoring problerns some new important normative questions arise. Thomas 
and \Vorrai (1990)[131] and Atkeson and Lucas (1992-1995)[11)[12] study principal-agent 
models and show that under full comrnitment there is an immiserization result. Since is 
chcaper to give incentives for low utility levels, then the optimal contract spreads util-
ity across states and eventually thc expcctcd utility of the agcnt goes to minus infinity 
with positive probability. The idea is that the variance of consumption is incrcasing, the 
concavity of the utility function lcads the result that average utility decreases. 
In Subsection 3.2.1 wc prese n t the "stage game" an d discuss some salient features 
of optimal principal-agent contracts when the relationship lasts a single period. In Sub-
section 3.2.2 we turn to tbc repeated moral hazard models and present some known 
properties of the intertemporal optimal contracts. Subsection 3.2.3 is devoted to present 
our recursive approach. 
For a generai reference on the material presented in the first two Subsections see 
Dutta and Radner (1994)[40] and Stole (1997)[128]. However, specific references \Vill be 
given in the text. 
3.2.1 The Static Moral Hazard Model 
A static (or stage game) principal-agent model is defined by the quintuple (A, p, Y, U, B). 
A is the set of actions that the agent can choose from. An action choice by the agent 
determines a distribution p( a), over output y; y E Y. The agent's action is unobservable 
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to the principal whereas the output is observable. The agent is paid by the principal 
on the basis of that which is observable; hence, the compensation depends only on the 
output and is denoted w(y) =w. U will denote the utility function of the agent and its 
arguments are the action undertaken an d the realized compensation; U (a, w). Finally, 
the principal's payoff depends on his return y- w and is denoted B(y- w). (Note that 
y an d w are real valued.) 
The maintained assumptions will be: 
(A3) There are only a finite number of possible outputs; y1 , y2 , ···YN, i.e. Y is finite. 
(A6) The set of agent's actions A is a finite set. 
(A 7) The agent utility is separable and strictly increasing in w and strictly decreasing 
1n a; 
U(w, a) = u(w)- C(a) 
where u is concave and C convex. 
(A8) The principal is risk neutral, i.e. B(y- w)= y- w. 
(A9) \fa E A and i = l, 2, ... N, Pi(a) > O. 
A compensation scheme for the agent will be denoted w = ( w1, w2, ••. w N). Further-
more, with some abuse of notation, we will write Pi(a) for the probability that the realized 
output is Yi, i = l, 2, .... N, when the action taken is a. 
The time structure is that of two-move game. The principal moves first and announces 
the compensation function w. Then the agent chooses his action, after learning w. The 
expected utility for the principal an d the agent are, respectively, 2:{:1 Pi (a) [Yi - wi] an d 
2:{:1 Pi(a)u(wi)- C( a). The principal-agent problem is to find a solution to the following 
optimizing exercise: 
N 
V(Uo) sup LPi(a) [Yi- wi] 
a,Wl,W2 1 ••• WN i=l 
sub 
N N 
LPi(a)u(wi)- C(a) > LPi(a)u(wi)- C(a,), \fà E A, 






~Pi(a)u(wi)- C(a) > Uo. (3.27) 
i= l 
Tbe constraint (3.26) is referred to as tbe incentive constraint; tbe agent will only 
take tbose actions that are in bis best interest. Constraint (3.27) is called the individual-
rationality or participation constraint; the agent will acce p t an arrangement only if his 
expected utility from sucb an arrangement is at least as large as bis outside option Uo. 
Tbe objective function, maximizing tbe principal's expected payoff, is, in part, a matter 
of convention. One interpretation of (3.24) is tbat tbere are many agents and only one 
principal, w bo consequently gets all tbe surplus, over and above tbe outside options of tbe 
principal ancl agent, generateci by tbe relationship. In contrast, the career concerns model 
of Chapter 5 is an example in which it is reasonable to assume competing principals. 
If there is a U0 such that (a*, w*) is a solution to tbe principal-agent problcm, tben 
(a*, w*) \vill be callccl a second-best solution. The terminology clistinguisbes (a*, w*) from 
a Pareto-optimal (or first-best) action-inccntivcs pair that ma.ximizcs (3.24) subject only 
to the incliviclual-rationality constraint (3.27). 
Uncler our assumption (A3),(A6)-(A9), Grossman and Hart (1983)[57] introduced 
a device for analyzing the principal-agent problems that we now discuss10 . Consider any 
action a E A and let G(a) denote the minimum expected cost at which the principal can 
induce the agent to take this action. Let Zi u( wi) an d, for a sake of rigor we \vrite 
G(a) = { infz,,z2 , ... zN 'L;:1 p;(a)u-1(z;) if 3~ such that implements a } 
oo otherw1se 
indeecl, note tbat some actions cannot be feasibly implemented witb any incentive scheme. 
For example, the principal cannot induce tbe agent to take a costly action that is domi-
10 Grossman and Hart admit a somewhat more generai specification then our pure separability. They 
generalize (A7) assuming U(a,w) = I<(a)u(w)- C(a) where I<(a) >O. That specification is equivalent 
to the requirement that the agent's preferences over income lotteries be independent of bis action. 
I'vioreover they discussed too what extend assumption (A9) can be relaxed allowing for risk adverse 
principal and found that (A9) is, in fact, a quite important assumption. 
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nated: Pi(a) = Pi(a') Vi, but C(a) > C(a'). In what follows, we will see that, in particular, 
if is possible to implement action a, then the problem has a solution, so we can replace 




LPi(a)zi- C(a) > LPi(a)zi- C( a), Va E A, (3.29) 
i= l i= l 
N 
LPi(a)zi- C(a) > Uo, (3.30) 
i=l 
Conditions (3.29) and (3.30) are simply the (rewritten) incentive and participation con-
straints and the point to note is that the incentive constraints are linear in the vari-
ables z1, z2 , ... zN. Furthcrmore, sincc by (A7) u(.) is concave, then thc inverse func-
tion is convex an d ben ce wc bave a convex programming problem 11 . The full principal-
agent problem then is to find an action that maximizes the net benefits of the principal 
L~1 Pi(a)yi- G(a). 
Proposition 22 Assume {A3} and {A6}-{A9}, then a second-best optimal action a* 
and a second-best optimal incentive scheme w* exist. 
Proof. The proof is made in two steps. First, we show that if the constraint set is 
nonempty for an action a E A then problem (3.28)-(3.29)-(3.30) has a solution. To do 
this first step, it is better to distinguish two cases. 
Consider first the case where u-1 is linear. Then it is easy to see that the principal 
can implement in particular the first best action with an incentive scheme Wi = Yi- q, 
11 The earlier literature on principal-agent models replaced the se t of incentive constraints (3.26) by the 
single constraint that, when the compensation scheme w 1 , ... WN is used, the agent satisfies his first order 
condition at the action a. That this procedure is, in generai, invalid was first pointed out by Mirrlees 
(1975)[93]. However Rogerson (1985)[112] found sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to be 
vali d; Je,vitt (1988) [68] weakened Rogerson's conditions. O ne advantage of the Grossman and Hart 
approach is, of course, that it avoids this "first-order approach". 
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where q is the principal first best net profit (he is selling the firm to the agent). Then 
the principal has the first best profits guaranteed whatever agent does. On the other 
hand, by picking a = aFB equal the first best action, the agent obtain expected utility 
U0 . Hence the proposition is certainly true when u- 1 is linear. 
On the other hand suppose u-1 is not linear. Note that for a given implementable 
action a, "L~ 1 Pi (a )zi is bounded below on the constraint se t (3.29)-(3.30). It therefore 
follows from a result of Bertsekas (1974)(21] that unbounded sequences in the constraint 
set make "L~ 1 Pi(a)u- 1(zi) tend to infinity (roughly because the variance of the z~s 
tends to infinity w bile their mean is bounded below, and u- 1 (zi) is convex and nonlinear 
( assurnption ( A9) is irnportant h ere)). Hence we can artificially bo un d the constraint 
set. Since the constraint set is closed, the existence of a minimum therefore follows from 
Weierstrass' theorem. 
Thc second stcp is to show that thc set of in1plernentable actions is not empty. Note 
that it is always possiblc (and optirnal) to implcment the action lcss costly for the agent 
\vith an insurance contract. From (A6) we just have to pick an action from the finite, non 
empty set ofimplementable actions. The one whose net principal's benefits "L~: 1 Pi(a)yi-
G(a) are ma.ximal is our second-best action a*. The relative \vage scheme is our w*. • 
Remark 4 Grossman and Hart showed existence when A is a general compact subset 
of some euclidea n space, requiring that limw-o u( w) = -oo. Under this assumption the 
principal 's objective function is lower semicontinuous. P age { 1991} {97} find condition t o 
guarantee that the set of wage functions w(y) are chosen in a compact space, showing 
existence when Y is a continuum. 
Although the (full) principal-agent model is typically not concave, the analysis of 
the cost-minimization problem alone can yield some useful necessary conditions for an 
optimal contract. For example, suppose, that u is differentiable. Then the l(uhn-Tucker 
conditions yield: 
l """ ( Pi(à)) 




where À and l-La are the (non-negative) multipliers associated with, respectively, the 
individual-rationality constraint and the incentive constraint (one for each a =l= a). The 
interpretation of (3.31) 12 is as follows: the agent is paid a base wage, À, which is adjusted 
if the i-th output is observed13 . In particular, if the incentive constraint for action a is 
binding, l-La > O, then the adjustment is positive if and only if the i-th output is more 
likely under the desired action a, than under a. 
Finally, we remark that Grossman and Hart found sufficient conditions on the family 
of distribution functions p(a), that guarantee the wage scheme is monotone in output 
levelsu. 
3.2.2 The Dynamic Principal Agent Model 
In a repeated principal-agent model, in each peri od t = O, l, 2, .... the stage game is 
playcd and the output observcd by both the principal and agcnt; dcnote thc output 
realizations and the compensation pairs, y(t) and w(t) respectively. The relationship 
lasts for oo periods. The public history at date t, that is common knowledge, is ht 
(y(O), w(O), .... y(t- 1), w( t- l)), \vhereas the private history of the agent is ht,a 
(a(O), y(O), w(O), .... ,a( t- 1), y(t- 1), w( t- l)). A strategy W for the principal is a se-
quence of maps mt(ht), where mt(ht) assigns to each public history, ht, a compensation 
function w( t). A strategy s for the agent is a sequence of maps St ( ht,a, w( t)), w h ere 
St(ht,a, w( t)) assigns to each pair (a private history ht,a and the principal's compensation 
function w(t)), an action a(t). 
W e call the couple (W, s) a contrae t. 
12 Note that the expression (3.31) is well defined because from (A7) we have in particular Pi(a) >O. 
13 Note that under our assumptions the participation constraint is always binding. Indeed from our 
separability and monotonicity assumption (A 7), if the constraint (3.30) is not binding the principal can 
always rearrange the wage scheme such that to reduce by a fi-xed amount (equal in any contingency) the 
agents utilities Zi. This new wage scheme still implements the desired action, and the principal has a net 
reduction in costs. 
14 The conditions are known in the literature as Monotone Likclihood Ratio Property and Concavity 
of Distribution Function Condition. Accidentally, these conditions are precisely the ones assumed by 
Rogerson (1985)[112] to prove the validity of the first-order approach. 
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A strategy choice by the principal and the agent induces, in the usual way, a distri-
bution over the set of histories (h t,a, h t); the pair of strategy choices therefore generate 
expected payoffs for the principal and agent in peri od t; denote these B (t; W, s) an d 
U(t; W, s )15 . Lifetime payoffs are evaluated under (the assumed common) discount fac-
tor 8, and equal to (1- 8) L::o 8tB(t; W, s) and (1- 8) L::o 8tU(t; W, s). The dynamic 
principal-agent problem is: 
00 








(l- 8) L 8tU(t; W, s) > U0 . (3.34) 
t=O 
The incentive constraint is (3.33) whercas the individuai rationality constraint is (3.34). 
If exists a contract (W*, s*) that solves (3.32)(3.33)(3.34) we call it a Nash second-best 
contrae t. 
Implicit in the formulation of the dynamic principal-agent problem is the idea that 
principal and agent are bound to the arrangement for the whole contract length. Nlore-
over, note t ha t we ha ve only o ne incentive constraint a t the beginning of the contract. 
This is not totally consistent with the imperfect monitoring characteristic of the game. 
Even allowing for enforceable infinite punishments, is not clear ho-w agents can imple-
ment su eh a contract if a deviation cannot be detected with certainty. However, note 
that if we require the incentive constraint to be satisfied at any node, then in particular 
(3.33) has to be satisfied at time zero. So, before introducing this refinement, we start 
t o characterize the "superset" of N ash second-best contracts. W e assume 
15 For example: 
U (t; W, s) E [u (w(t))- C (st(ht,a, w(t))) l W,s], 
where the expectation is taken over all possible historics ht,a, ht and actions such that w( t) = m 1,(h,t) 
under (W, s). The wage w( t) is a random variable whose distribution is determined by the contract 
(W,s). 
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(AlO) The Agent bas no access to tbe credit market. 
Lambert ( 1983) [76) an d Rogerson ( 1985) [ 111] bave estabiished necessary condi tions 
for a second-best contract. We report bere tbe resuits of Rogerson; the resuit is a con-
dition tbat bears a family resemblance to the well known Euier condition from optimai 
growth tbeory. It says tbat the principai will smooth the agent's utiiities across time 
periods in such a fashion as to equate bis own marginai utiiity in the current period to 
his expected marginai utility in the next. We aiso present tbe proof of tbis resuit since 
it illustrates tbe ricber incentives engaged by repeating tbe principal-agent relationsbip. 
Tbe proof is given in Rogerson (1985) but is due to Mirrlees. 
Denote tbe output tbat is realized in period t by Yi· Let the period t compensation paid 
by the principal, after the public bistory h t and then the observation of Yi, be denoted Wi· 
After observing the private bistory ht,o and the output/compensation realized in period 
t, yjwi, i = l, 2, .... N, the agent takes an action in period t+ l; denote this action ai. 
Denote the output that is realized in period t+ l (as a conscquence of the agent's action 
ai) Yi, j = l, 2, ..... N. Finally denote the compensation paid to the agent in period t+ l 
when this output is observed Wij, j = l, 2, ..... N. 
Proposition 23 Let (W*, s*) be a Nash second-best contract. After every histonJ (ht,o, ht), 
the actions taken by the agent and the compensation paid by the principal must be such 
that 
(3.35) 
Proof. Pick a history pair (ht,o, ht) in the piay of (W*, s*) and Iet zi = u(wi)· Construct 
a new incentive scheme W that differs from W* only after (ht,o, h t) in the following 
special way: Zi = zi, Zij = Zij far all j and i f= i but zi = Zi - 6., Zij = zij + %, where 
6. lies in a small interval around zero. In word, in the contract W, after history (ht, Yi), 
the principal offers a utility smoothing of 6. between period t and t + l. 
It is straightforward to check, given the additive separability of agent's preferences, 
that the ne-vv scheme continues to have a bes t responsc of s*, moreover, the agent's utility 
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is unchanged therefore, the scheme is individually rational. Since (W*, s*) is a solution to 
the principal-agent problem, W* is, in fact, the least costly scheme for the principal that 
implements s* ( à la Grossman an d Hart). In particular, /:).. = O must sol ve the principal's 
cost minimization exercise along this history. The first-order condition for that to be the 
case is easily verified to be (3.35) 16 . • 
Since the principal can be equivalently imagined to be providing the agent mone-
tary compensation, wi, or the utility associateci with such compensation zi, u-1(z) can 
be thought to be the principal's "utiiity" function. Equation (3.35), and the proof of 
the proposition, then says that the principal will maintain intertemporal incentive and 
provi de insurance so as to equa te his ( expected) marginai utili ti es across periods. 
An im1nediate corollary of (3.35) is that the second-best compensation schemes will be, 
in generai, history-dependent; the compensation paicl in the current period will depend 
not just on the observecl current output, but also on the past observations of output. To 
see this note that if wij, the compensation in period t + l, were independent of peri od t 
output, wij = Wkj for i =l= k, then the right hand side of (3.35) is itseif independent of i 
an hence so must the left-hand side be independent of i. If u is strictiy concave this can 
be true oniy if wi = wk, for i =l= k. But \Ve do know that a fixed compensation provides 
an agent perverse incentives, from the principal's point of view. History dependence in 
the second-best contract is also quite intuitive; by conditioning future payoffs on current 
output, and varying these payoff appropriately in the observed output, the principal 
adds a dimension of incentives t ha t are absent in the static contracts ( which only allow 
for variations across current payments). So a new question arises. Are those incentive 
necessary ? Put differentiy, when can short term contracts perform as well as long-term 
contracts ? 
16 Is important to note that in the above argument (as in ~y Euler's variational like argument), 
it was necessary for the construction of the incentive scheme W that the principal be able to offer a 
compensation strictly lower than min {wi,Wij}, i= l, .. N, j =l, .. N. This, in turn, is possible to do 
whenever there is unbounded liability which \Ve have allowed. If we restrict the compensation to be at 
least as large as some lower bound 1Q, then the argument would require the additional condition that 
min { wi, Wij} >w. 
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Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990)(46] showed the importance of the agent's 
credit market restrictions, the agent's perfect access to credit markets results in short-
term contracts being as equally effective as long term contracts. They showed, in finite 
period setting, that if aH public information can be used in contracting and recontracting 
takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences, then agent's 
perfect access to credi t market results in short term contracts being as equally effective as 
long term contracts. Other analysis of the relationship between short-term and long-term 
contracts are Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988)(84] and Rey and Salanie' (1990)(109]. 
For a review see Chiappori et al. (1994) (29]. 
Our essential summary did not touched some interesting extension. Among others we 
mention the case w h ere agents can (or cannot commi t no t t o) recontract in an interirn 
stage, i.e. after agent takcn the period t action but before period t output is realized. 
Fudenberg an d Tirol e (1990) (50), Nla (1991) (83), Hcrmalin an d l(atz (1991) (63), an d thc 
exponential (or constant absolute risk avcrsion) case for which Holmstrom and Nlilgrom 
( 198 7) [ 65] showed the optimal second-bes t contracts are linea r. For this an d other issues 
see Stole (1997)[128]. 
3.2.3 The Recursive Formulation of Spear and Srivastava 
The formulation in (3.32)(3.33)(3.34) appears very complicateci, and the memory result 
from (3.35) suggests that actual output cannot be a sufficient statistic. So defining a 
parsimonious state variable does not appears to be a trivial task. 
Spear and Srivastava (1987)[126] use an approach similar to ours of Section 3.1 and 
introduce a recursive formulation for the infinitely repeated principal-agent problem. 
We present the approach in a sequence of steps. 
First, note that the principal does not have private information, so he is forced to 
use only public strategies. From the discussion at the end of Proposition 11 in Chapter 
2 we know that the agent cannot do any better by conditioning on his private history of 
past actions. Indeed they are not payoff relevant. We conclude that the private history 
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dependence in the specification (3.32) is not needed and we can focus only on public 
history. 
Second, if we restrict ourself to pure strategies then we can reduce further the set 
of relevant public histories. W e claim t ha t, when the contract (W, s) is specified, then 
everything can be written as a function of output histories, yt = (y(O), y(1), .... y(t- 1)). 
Indeed, start from peri od O. A t t ime zero, sin ce h0 = 0 the wage compensation of the prin-
cipal mo(h0 ) is a vector of wages that can depend only on period zero output realization 
y(O), so we can write m 0 (h0 ) = {wi(0)}~ 1 , where each wi(O) = fo(Yi)· Consider now the 
first period compensation. In principle m 1(h1 ) can depend both on y1 = (y(O)) and on 
past compensation w(O), but is clear from the notation that we can always sol ve out and 
define: m 1 (h1 ) = m 1 (y1, w(O)) = m 1 (y1, f 0 (y(O))) = m1 (y1 ). Finally, also the action a(t) 
can be specified as a function of only the public output history yt, indeed we can write 
a(t) = St(ha,t,mt(ht)) = sf(ht,mt(ht)) = sf(yt,w(O), ... w(t-l),mt(Y(O), .. ,y(t))) = 
sf (yt, fo(y(O)), ... , ft-I(Yt-I), mt(Yt)) = St(Yt), where the "p" supcrindex means the strat-
cgy is public. In conclusion, note that the principal payoff does not depend on the agent 
action, the principal cannot infer in any way the agent's action. In what follows for a 
contract (W, s) we will mean his reduced formulation as a function of yt alone17 . We 
remark that from Proposition 11 in Chapter 2 we know that we are not loosing in gener-
ality. For any Nash second-best contract where the strategies can be made contingent on 
the "full-histories" h t, ht,a there exists a payoffs equivalent contract defined as a function 
of only the output histories yt. 
Third, we introduce a refinement. We willlook for Public Perfect Equilibria requiring 
incentive compatible contracts to have an incentive compatible continuation. Denote 
(W(yt), s(yt)) the continuation the contract (W, s) after output history yt occurred. Let 
B (W(yt), s(yt)) and U (W(yt), s(yt)) induced discounted expected continuation values 
17 From now on, a contract will be the above specified sequence of maps {mt(Yt), St(Yt) }:0 . where 
illt(Yt) and St(Yt) are Fcmeasurable. 
The filtration Ft is referred to the product space (Yt, yt) implied by the finite output historics ?l. 
Finally, in what follows with some abusc of notation we denote illt(Yt) = m 1.(yt) St(Yt) = St(Yt) for any 
yt. 
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for the principal and the agent18 . Note we can write recursively: 
N 
U (W(yt),s(yt)) = LPi(a(t)) [u(wi(t))- C(a(t)) +8U (W(yt,yi),s(yt,yi))]. 
i=l 
vVhere a(t) = St(Yt) = St(Yt) and {wi(t)}~l = w(t) = iìit(Yt) = mt(Yt). Given this 
refìnement we have the following defìnition of second-best 
Definition 12 A contract (W*, s*) is said second-best if it is incentive compatible after 
any O'Utput histonJ yt and if there is no other incentive compatible after any output history 
yt contract which offers both parties at least as much expected utility and one party strictly 
more, 'l. e. solves far some initial v0 
supB (W, s) 
s,W 
sub: 
U (W(yt), s(yt)) ~ U (W(yt), s(yt)), Vs, Vyt 
U(W,s) ~va. 
The next Proposition is the heart of our analysis. As we did in Section 3.1, we 
show that for the repeated principal-agent problema second-best contract is sequentially 
efficient. 
Proposition 24 Let (W*, s*) be a second-best contract, then far any output history yt 
the continuation (W*(yt), s*(yt)) satisfies 
18 For example: 
w h ere w( t + n) is induced by the maps mt+n (yt+n \yt) of wage schemes after output history yt. 
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sub: 
U (W(yt+n), s(yt+n)) 2 U (W(yt+n), s(yt+n)) ' Vs, Vyt+n\yt' n 2 O. 
U (W(yt), s(yt)) =v. 
Proof. Consider and optimal contract (W*, s*). By definition it is incentive compatible, 
moreover, for any ou t pu t history yt, the contingent pian (W*, s*) defines a continuation 
utility U (W*(yt), s*(yt)) for the agent. Fix v = U (W*(yt), s*(yt)). Our strategy of 
proof is by contradiction. Suppose not, i.e. assume that there exists another contract 
(W, s) su eh t ha t after some output history yt the continuation (W(yt), s(yt)) gives to 
the principal an higher continuation utility the o ne implied by (W* (yt), s* (yt)) , with an 
incentive co1npatible contract that guarantees to the agent a continuation utility of v. But 
tben at t= O tbe principal could bave written a new contract (W, S). This new contract 
would bave been su cb t ba t i t followcd (W, s) only aftcr yt an d (W*, s*) otherwise. Sin ce 
(W, s) is, by assumption, inccntive compatible after history yt an d gives to tbc agent 
tbe same utility v, thcn also this new contract (W, S) would be incentive compatible and 
would give bigher utility to the principal. So we have a contradiction, (W*, s*) could not 
bave been optimal. • 
1\ote that implicit in the proof is that in any node yt is common knowledge both that 
(W(yt), s(yt)) is incentive compatible an d that v is the agent continuation utility for both 
(W(yt), s(yt)) and (W*(yt), s*(yt)). Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990)(46) cali 
tbese properties common knowledge of technology and preferences. The repeated nature 
of tbe game is important bere. Moreover, assumption (AlO) guarantees the principal 
can contro! the agent's utility through wage payments. If the agent is allowed to save 
and savings are not observable, then it could be that at some node yt the continuation 
utility v is not common knowledge. 
Proposition 25 Suppose 3 a second best contraci (W*, s*). And considera generic his-
tory ht with associated agent's expected utility U (W*(yt), s*(yt)). The principal's contin-
uation payoffB (W*(yt), s*(yt)) implied by the optimal contraci (W*, s*) can be obtained 
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by a new second best contrae t (W0 , s0 ) starting a t ti me zero where the agent is required 
to receive v= U (W*(yt), s*(yt)). 
Proof. The proof is just an application of Proposition 12 in Chapter 2. • 
The previous Proposition allow us to use the following recursive formulation. Let v 
the discounted utility promised to the agent at the beginning of the period. Given v, 
the problem can be stated as if the principal selects three functions a( v), w( v, y), v'(v, y) 
determining the current action a( t) = a(vt), the current wage w( t) = w(vt, y(t)), and a 
promised utili ty V t+ 1 = v' (V t, y (t)). If w e denote by Yi the i- t h p ossi ble realization of 
y (t), the eh o ice of the t h ree functions a (v), w (v, Yi), v' (v, Yi) must satisfy the following 
two sets of constraints: 
v 
N 








Equation (3.36) requires the contract to deliver the promised level of discounted utility 
and is called the promise keeping constraint. Constraint (3.37) is the incentive compati-
bility constraint requiring the agent to want to deliver the amount of effort called for in 
the contract. 
Proposition 26 Le t F( v) be the value t o the principal associated with promising dis-
counted utility v t o the agent. The principal 's Bellman equation is 
N 
F(v) = sup LPi(a(v)) [Yi- w( v, Yi) + 8F (v'(v, Yi))], 
a,w,v' i=l 
(3.38) 
where the ma.'Eimization is aver functions a( v), w( v, Yi), v'(v, Yi) and is subject to the con-
straints {3.36) and {3.37). 
75 
Proof. Consider the problem 
F(v) = supB (W, s) 
s,W 
sub 
U (W(yt), s(yt)) > U (W(yt), s(yt)) , Vs(yt), Vyt 
U(W,s) = v. 
Proposition 24 allows us to write 
N 
sup LPi(a(O)) [B (wi(O)) + 8B (W(yi), s(yi))] 
a( O), {w i (O),s(yi),W(yi)}[:, 1 i= 1 
sub: 
N 
LPi(a(O)) [u (wi(O))- C (a(O)) + 8U (W(yi), s(yi))] 
i=l 
N 
> LPi(a) [u (wi(O))- c (a)+ 8U (W(yi), s(yi))], Va, 
i=l 
U(W,s) =v, 
w h ere the contract continuations (W(yi), s(yi)) are itself incentive compatible for any 
future output history yt\yi, t 2: l. Nloreover, if we call (W*(yi), s*(yi)) the optimal 
solution, then, for any Yi, from Proposition 24 (W*(yi), s*(yi)) obeys to: 
N 
sup Lp1(a(l)) [B (wj(l)) + 8B (W(yi, Yi), s(yi, Y1))] 
a( l),{ Wj (l),s(yi,Yj ),W(yi ,yj nf=l j=l 
sub: 
N 




> LPi(a) [u (wi(O))- c (a)+ bU (W(yi, Yi), s(yi, Yi))]' va, 
i= l 
and, again, each contract continuation (W(yi, Yi), s(yi, Yi)) is incentive compatible for any 
future history yt\ (yi, Yi), t 2 2. From Proposition 25 we can substitute B (W*(yi), s*(yi)) 
with F( vi). By induction we obtain our result. • 
U nfortunately, as a consequence of the structure of the incentive constraints, the 
constraint set fails to be convex. Spear and Srivastava could prove some monotonicity, 
but the concavity and the differentiability of the value function is stili an assumption. 
This problem has been overcome by Phelan and Townsend by convexifying the constraint 
set through randomizations. 
Before sun1marizing the Phelan and Townsend results, we remark that the recursive 
approach does not have only the advantage that numerica! simulation can be (more or less 
easily) implemented ( although this is an important advantage). Sometimes is possible to 
determine a closed form solution for the value function F. In this case the characteristics 
of the contract can be fully charactcrized because, as usual in dynamic programming, the 
value function summarizes all the rclevant inforn1ation. In Chapter 5 we present a closed 
form solution for the log utility agent case. The only other known closed form solution 
is found by Phelan (1993)[102] for the CARA utility agent. 
Related Works We have not considered the case where one or both agents cannot 
commit to a long-term relationship. The result is a mixture of the results we presented 
in this and the previous Section. Phelan (1993) [102] extended the model of this chapter 
by in1posing a participation constraint for the agent. Phelan (1995)(104] and Atkeson and 
Lucas (1992 and 1995)[11](12] introduce commitment problems in a hidden information 
repeated m or al hazard problem an d eliminate the "immiserization" result of Thomas an d 
vVorral (1990)[131], furthermore, Atkeson and Lucas (1992 and 1995)[11](12] prescnted a 
decentralization result \vhich links our model with a generai equilibrium setting. 
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Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1996)[66] use the recursive approach we presented to ana-
lyze a version of the Shavell and Weiss (1979)[123] problem of optimal unemployment 
compensation. 
The "À-mechanism" of Marcet and Niarimon (1992) [85] is one of the first example of 
optimal contracts with growth and imperfect monitoring that uses a recursive approach 
similar to ours. 
Finally, recently Rustichini (1998)[116] analyze incentive constraints with growth us-
ing another related dynamic programming approach. 
A Numerica! Approach Phelan and Townsend (1990)[105] extended the principal's 
eh o ice to the space of lotteries over actions a an d outcomes w, v'. To introduce Phelan and 
Townsend's forn1ulation, let ( as before) p( a) be the family of the (discrete) probability 
distribution over Y, one distribution function for any action a E A, A finite. Imagine now 
that wage and values are also constrained to lie in discrete spaces W, V, respectively. Phe-
lan and To\vnsend instruct the principal to choose a probability distribution lli(a, w, v') 
subject first to the constraint that for ali fixed (a, Yi) 
N 
L ITi(a, w, v') Pi(a) L L ITi(a, w, v') (3.39a) 
W xV WxV i=l 
ITi(a,w,v') > o (3.39b) 
N 
L L ITi(a, w, v') l. (3.39c) 
AxWxV i=l 
Condition (3.39a) simply states that the joint distributions bave to be consistent with 
our conditionals Pi(a) (if multiplied by the marginai has to give the joint distributions). 
The ren1aining conditions of (3.39) just require that "probabilities are probabilities". The 
counterpart of (3.36) is 
N 
v= L Lni(a,w,v')[u(w)+8v'-C(a)] (3.40) 
Ax\VxV i=l 
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After some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the counterpart of (3.37) as 
N 
L L ITi(a, w, v') [u (w)+ 8v'- C( a)] 
WxV i=l 
> L t ITi(a, w, v')p:((!)) [u (w)+ 8v'- C(a)] va E A 
WxVi=l Pt 
(3.41) 
The Bellman equation for the principal (3.38) is 
F( v) = rnax ITi(a, w, v') { (y- w)+ 8F( v')}, 
n i 
(3.42) 
where the maximization is over the probabilities ITi(a, w, v') subject to (3.39), (3.40) and 
(3.41). The problem on the right band side of (3.42) is a linear programming problem. 
Think of each of (a, y, w, v') being constrained to a discrete grid of points. Then, for 
example, the tenn u (w)+8v' -C( a) on the right hand side of (3.42) can be represented as 
a fixed vector that multiplies a vectorial version of the probabilities ITi(a, w, v'). Similarly, 
each of the constraints (3.39), (3.40) and (3.41) can be represented as a linear inequality 
in the choice variables (the probabilities ili)· Phelan and Townsend compute solutions of 
these linear programs to iterate on the Bellman equation (3.42). Note that each step of 
the iteration on the Bellman equation, there is one linear program to be solved for each 
point v in the space of grid values for V. In practice, Phelan and Townsend bave often 







Inefficiencies in Dynamic Family 
Decisions: An Incomplete Contracts 
Approach to Labor Supply. 
4.1 Introduction 
Virtually all models of the household assume that the allocation of resources within the 
family is Pareto efficient. During the 80s the consensus model of Samuelson[119] and 
Becker's[15] [16] altruistic model were challenged by the development of models that recog-
nize the specificity of preferences of each family member and determine intra-household 
allocations as an efficient solution to a cooperative bargaining game between spouses1 . 
In the early 90s Chiappori [27] [28] generalized those models using an approach which 
does not rely on any particular cooperative solution and requires only Pareto efficiency. 
However, Udry(133] recently found inefficiencies in land and working time allocations 
vvithin African households caused by commitment problems between spouses2• 
1 See Lundberg and Pollak[82] for a quick review. 
2Udry suggests also the possibility of cxistence of asymmetric information. As we will see, in our 
framework, this is not required for the incfficiency result. 
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The present paper presents a dynamic model that uses a contractual approach to mar-
riage an d shows how inefficiencies arise in in tra-household time allocation determination. 
We agree with the common wisdom, interpreting the household as an institution char-
acterized by long term relationships with symmetric information. However, we believe 
t ha t the marriage contract an d the in tra-household arrangements ha ve a strong character 
of incompleteness. Partners cannot commit on not recontracting, ex-post, on previously 
agreed arrangements. If law does not require the verification of the reasons of divorce, 
then renegotiation-proof first best contracts are not feasible. As a consequence, we show 
that if agents cannot remarry, then spouses tend to work less than the effi.cient level (un-
derwork ). l\!loreover, we show that remarriage opportunities can offset this inefficiency 
and: actually reverse the result inducing spouses to overwork with respect to the efficient 
level. 
In Section 2 we first study a Inodel without remarriage or inter-temporal consider-
ations. In this model spouses tend to work less than the efficient level because ex-post 
bargaining makes agents only partial residual claimants of their labor income (hold-up 
problem). We then solve the dynamic version of our model, in which we allow for marriage 
market effects and we find suffi.cient conditions leading to inefficiently high levels of labor 
supply decisions for both partners. In a vvorld where there are no despotic marriage re-
lationships and where the relative bargaining position depends on outside opportunities, 
both partners can tend to work more in order to accumulate marketable human capitai 
and improve remarriage opportunities. This result suggests that inter-temporal consider-
ations may lead to inefficiencies that in a static setting cannot be detected. Moreover we 
can use our model to give a normative content of the term overworking linked to some 
recent findings for the US economy (Schor[121]3). 
In Section 3 we use our m o del t o explore some puzzling features of the US labor sector. 
3Schor found a consistent decline in US leisure and supported the debate about overworked Americans. 
To the weak decline in middle aged men labor-force-participation rate Schor opposed the sharp increase 
of labor supply of both young men and women, especially after the 70s. :Nioreovcr shc presents results 
supporting the hypothesis that also working hours per employed agent raised. However, demand side 
issues are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Smith and Ward [124] have noted that real wage growth explains most of the increase in 
the post war female labor supply. However, in the period after 1970, the female-labor-
supply growth rate rose, while the real-wage growth rate fell. Michael [91]provides a 
partial explanation by identifying a positive effect of divorce probability on the labor-
market decisions of married women4 . Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the whole 
story. Peters, on one hand, argues that the change in US divorce law, during the 70s, 
induced no variation of the probability of divorce. On the other hand, she found that the 
change from fault to no-fault divorce raised the labor-force-participation rate of married 
women (see also Parkman[98]). So there should be some element omitted in Michael's 
analysis. TI·ying to reconcile those anomalies we show that the change from fault to 
no-fault divorce law reduced the ex-ante renegotiation-proof contracts set. With both 
clivorce laws it is possible to implement a contract \Vhich induces efficient divorce. But, 
with no-fault clivorce, son1e inefficiencies in labor decisions cannot be eliminateci and the 
result is that both partners overwork. 
Pollack[l06) initiated the transaction costs literature giving a theoretical foundation 
to collective bargaining models. A work closely related to ours is that of Cohen[32). He 
analyzes the role of existing and potential divorce contracts in limiting the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior of married men in quasi-rents appropriation5 . 
None of those papers presents a forn1al model for the analysis and, to our knowledge, 
there are fe\v papers which formally analyze family decisions in an environment with sig-
nificant transaction costs. Allen[7) suggests that the existence of monitoring costs may 
cause inefficient sharing \Vithin marriage and analyzes the effects of those transaction 
costs in marriage market. I<onrad et al.[74] assume agents decide opportunistically prior 
to marriage human capitai endo\vments ancl show that the inefficient over-accumulation 
can arise both when agents forecast a cooperative behavior during marriage and when 
·
1The articles by Peters[lOl] and Johnson and Skirmer[69] seem to provide additional insights into 
this anomaly. 
50ther references are Allen[6] and Becker et al.[18] who focuscd on the role of the state in marriage. 
Generally speaking they argue that the state intervention can be welfare improving because it reduces 
some of the transaction costs cxisting within the family . .Nioreover see Becker et al.[17]. 
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they forecast an opportunisti c behavior. Weiss et al. [135](136] interpret the inefficiencies 
in children support between divorced couples as a consequence of the impossibility to 
enforce ex-ante Pareto optimal maritai contracts. In Weiss et al.[136] they look at the 
( empirically detected) positive relationship between divorce transfers and the couple dif-
ferentials in earnings during marriage as a test in favor of the existence of transactions 
costs within the family. King[72J an d Borenstein et al. (24} develop rudimental dynamic 
frameworks in which they analyze how the during marriage investments in human capi-
tal are affected by the risk of divorce. In both models human capitai return is assumed 
exogenous and the distortions come because property rights are not perfectly defined 
(hedging purpose). Only in Echevarria et al.[41] we find a fully dynan1ic framework. 
In their OLG model parents behave altruistically with their children, and decide chil-
dren lnnnan capitai endowments taking as given that during marriage spouses will play 
a cooperative Nash bargaining game. They apply their rnodel to study human capitai 
accumulation and fcrtility in US economy; however, in Echevarria et al. tirne allocations 
are assumed exogenousG. 
In our n1odellabor supply decisions are endogenous and the outside opportunities are 
changing over time through on-the-job-training human capitai accumulation. vVe think 
the model can represent a useful tool for the analysis of the process of intra-household 
decision making in inter-temporal settings. 
As said, in Section 2 we analyze the nature of inefficiencies. In Section 3 we pursue 
the policy exercise. The last section concludes and presents our future research agenda. 
4.2 The Basic Model 
In this section we present our basic model. The principal results of this section are 
the following. First, in Proposition 27 we show that the one-stage gan1e predicts un-
derworking . .ìvioreover, Proposition 28 shows that intertemporal considerations are not 
6 Another related paper is Lommerud[81]. He assumes that, during marriagc, decisions are Pareto 
optimal because arrangemcnts between-spouses can be enforced by "voi ce". 
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enough to overcome this kind of inefficiencies. However, in Proposition 29, we will see 
that the dynamic model, joint with the possibility of remarriage, can reverse the results 
and predicts overworking. 
4.2.1 Pareto Optimal Decisions 
The family relationship lasts for two stages and agents have the following intertemporal 
utility function: 
w h ere Ct is consumption, l t is working t ime a t t ime t (t = l, 2) an d 8 is the usual 
discount factor. Note that our agents are risk neutral and that we assume the cost 
function v(.) to be increasing, differentiable, strictly convex7 and v'(O) =O. 
vVorking time providcs labor income and allows to accumulate human capitai via on-
the-job training. The la\v of motion for human capitai is implicit in the following wage 
equation: 
(4.1) 
w h ere W t is the t-stage wage an d h( w1, . ) is increasing an d \veakly concave in h. 
Efficient decisions n1aximize the total family welfare. Under our assumptions we can 
determine any Pareto optimal allocation assuming that consumption among agents is 
allocateci using lump sum transfers (Tt)· So each spouse solves the following problem: 
(4.2) 
7 It is worth noting t ha t actually we will require something more t han this. v(.) has to be such t ha t 
the problem for l1 is concave. This is required for two important reasons. First we will use only first 








The conditions on v(.) guarantee interiority for every positive wage level. Assuming 
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where l~ = l2 (w2) and from (4.6) l2(.) is the inverse of the first derivative of v(.); T 2 
is exogenous8 . 
Two remarks are worth making. First, note that applying envelope theorem t o ( 4.8) 
and totally differentiating (4.6) we obtain V"(w2) =l~(.)= v"\.) >O, V(w2) is convex in 
w2. This implies that the assumption of concavity in l1 is not innocuous9 . Second, note 
that since there are no income effects the Pareto optimallabor supply decision is unique 
for every lump sum transfer choice. So we can always seta feasible transfer scheme in such 
a way that both the male and the female participation constraints are satisfied. Given 
0 Using Bellman's principle, the problem for l1 is: 
lvfaxl 1 w1l1 + Tt- v(lt) + 8V(w2) 
sub : (4.1), and w 1 given. 
9 However, for example, the quadratic cost function -v(l) = -l2 and the linear accumulation rule 
w2 = w1 +a* l1 meet all the concavity requirements for a < 2. 
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the couple is uncertain of the quality of the match, Yt 11 . vVhen this random variable is 
realized the partners reevaluate their originai decisions an d, in particular, decide whether 
or not to remain married. We assume enforceability problems in the ex-ante contract 
setting are such t ha t agents cannot avo id renegotiation. In particular, sin ce la w allows 
unilateral divorce ( no-fault ) , then each partner can threaten divorce, ex-post, in arder to 
renegotiate the initial surplus divisions. In this case the ex-post consumption assignments 
will be determined during the bargaining process, whatever was the initial agreement. 
Rational agents will take this bargaining process outcome as given when deciding their 
working hours, leading to the usual hold-up problem. In this basic model the specific 
investment nature of labor supply decisions depends on the divorce rule, exogenously 
given in our framework. In Section 3 we will study the role played by different divorce 
laws in the familiar contractual setting. 
In arder to detcrmine the cquilibriurn dccisions we proceed backwards. Given ex-post 
bargaining, the consurnption levels at the end of stage 2 are obtained dividing the farniliar 
incarne 12 according to the following rule12 : 
(4.9) 
where 12 = w2Ll!! + w~ l~ + y2 , is the farnily incarne realized at the beginning of 
stage-two bargaining section; y2 represents the marriage gains and O~ are the outside 
11 In order to simplify the analysis we do not introduce a particular distribution for Yt· However, 
we implicitly assume that Yt is both the expected and the (a.s.) realized one. The non verifiability 
characteristic of Yt allows agents to threaten divorce ex-post. For a similar simplification see Hart(59]. 
12 This is the usual generalized Nash Bargaining solution with parameter {3, i.e. (4.9) solves: 
111 ax (cm - om)(3(rl - of)l-(3 
c![',c{ 2 2 ~.l 2 
sub 
h > c2n + ~ 
O?t, O~ gwen. 
The Nash solution can be non-cooperatively founcled by an alternating offer game with exogenous 
probability of termination (Binmore et al.(23]). 
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opportunities at the end of the period for agenti= m, f. o~ are defined by the following 
divorce rule. In case of divorce, the couple looses y2 . Moreover, the husband is forced to 
pay an alimony transfer T(.) to the wife (for example, a child support) and the size of 
such transfer is increasing in the within marriage labor incarne w2l213 . So the (static) 
outside opportunities of the spouses are: 
02 = w2l2- T(w2l2), 
0{ = w{l{ + T(w2l2). 
( 4.10) 
Notice that when the husband has to decide working time he has to consider also 
the effect of his decision on his wife's outside opportunity. Substituting ( 4.10) into ( 4.9) 
we obtain c;n = 0It + (3y2 . So, at the beginning of stage two the agent will choose his 
working tirne1·1 according to: 
( 4.11) 
T' (.) > O implies a marginal specificity of the labor t ime an d the result will be 
underworking15 ( \Ve \Vill assume T'(.) < l for interiority ), as is summarized in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 27 Given a positive wage level w. lf T'(.) >O far any positive income level, 
then the one-stage versi an of the mode l leads to underworl._--ing, i. e. the equilibrium labor 
13 Empirical evidence for this assumption can be found in vVeiss et al.[l36J. 
14 Soving the problem: 
AI= AI axli" c;n- v(L;1 ) 
sub ( 4.9)( 4.10) w2 given. 
15 An alternative assumption coulcl be to assume that divorce will imply one or both parties to pay a 
fraction of labor income as divorce costs, in this case: 
\vhere ki is the cost of divorce, proportional to labor income. The solution for this case can be found 
in a previous draft of the paper. 
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levell~ is lower than the Pareto optimal one. 
Proof. Consider (equal) initial conditions w= w2 =w~ > O. Interiority implies income 
is positive, so by assumption T 1 (.) > O. Because of backward solving, t be conditions ( 4.6) 
an d ( 4.11) define the efficient an d inefficient solutions of tbe one-stage game starting a t 
the end of stage l, respectively. Witb T'(.) > O the rigbt band side of equation (4.11) 
is strictly less than tbe rigbt band side of equation ( 4.6). From interiority the same 
inequality bas to be true also for tbe left band si d es. Tbe convexity of v(.) gives our 
result. • 
\Ve have seen tbat witbout intertemporal considerations tbe model predicts undoubt-
edly underworking for the busband (In tbis special case tbe wife will supply the Pareto 
optirnallevel of labor. The wife's problem is solved in the section 3.)IG. In an intertcn1-
poral setting tbe endogeneity. of the outside opportunity not only affects the marginai 
specificity of tbc labor tin1e investrnent. Hun1an capitai accumulation affects the agents' 
position in the ex-post bargaining proccss. The following analysis will be mainly focused 
on the study of tbis bargaining effect. 
In order t o distinguisb from the Pareto optimal problem notation (V (.)) define bus-
band's value function while n1arried at tbe beginning of stage 2 as lvi(.,.), wbere: 
(4.12) 
c;,m =cm( w~, wt) is the optimal decisions according to equation (4.9), witb zt taken 
"' rv 
as given and z;,m =l2 (w2), l2 (.) defined implicitly by equation (4.11). The wife's value 
function F(., .) is defined analogously. In stage l, at tbe beginning of the bargaining 
section, the initiallabor decisions for both partners are known (and sunk). Agents start 
bargaining and the outcome will assign to agent m the following level of utility: 
( 4.13) 
16 In the alternative case presented in footnote 15 also the wife's labor decision will be inefficiently 
lower than the Pareto optimal one. 
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function Di (.). In particular we are interested in determining how Dm ( w2) vari es as a 
function of w2. Indeed we will see that w ha t crucially determines the results are the 
assumptions o n Di (.). In particular we \vili consider in turn two environments. Firstly, 
we will assume that there are no remarriage opportunities so that we can evaluate the 
pure intertemporal effect (Case A). After that, we will allow agents to remarry (Case B). 
The next proposition shows how intertemporal considerations alone are not enough to 
offset the (static) inefficiency stated in Proposition 27. In Proposition 29 we will see how 
marriage market considerations can change this first result. 
Case A: N o Remarriage Assume that if an agent decides to divo ree then he will 
remai n alone t ili the end of the game. rdoreover, we assume that t h ere is no change in 
preferences from bcing single ancl, for sirnplicity, assume that the alimony for the stage 
l divorce is not due after the end of stage l. Thcn tbc agent m's divorce value function 
is defined: 
Dm ( T1L) mzO,m. (lO, m) Lf nLzm (lm) W2 = W2 2 - v 2 = Jv. axl2 W2 2 - v 2 ( 4.16) 
where l~,m = l2 (w2), l2 (.) is the inverse of the marginai cost of labor, given from (4.6) 
with w2 = w2. The problem faced by a single agent is the Pareto optimal one. The 
only difference is the absence of marriage gains, so the consumption is reduced by the 
transfers. The following proposition summarizes the principal result for this first case. 
Proposition 28 vVithout remarriage the first stage husband labor supply decision l~ is 
less than the Pareto optimal one. 
Proof. Start \vith equal initial conditions w~ = w 1. Rewriting equation ( 4.14) we have: 
(l _ T'(.))w 8 ah [(l _ (3) dDm( w2) (3 (a !v!( w2, w{) aF( w2, w{))] 
l + az d m + a m + a rn 
l w2 w2 w2 
(l - T 1 (.))wl + Ò ;~ [(l - .B) ~~,m + ,8 (l;•m) l , ( 4.17) 
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where the equality in (4.17) comes from (4.15) and from applying envelope theorem 
to (4.8) and (4.16). Now rearranging equation (4.17) we have: 
< w1 ( 4.18) 
dv( l~) - 8 ah [zo] 
dl1 az1 2 • 
The strie t inequality holds because a t an interi or solution T 1 (.) > O. The las t equality 
comes from (4.7). From Proposition 27 (underworking in the last stage) we have that the 
last term in the left hand side of the first rOW is always positive ( for any W2 > 0 l~,m > 
z;·m ), so the inequality in ( 4.18) implies the following: 
Now note that by the definition of Dm(.) in (4.16) and V(.) in (4.8), at the optimal 
solution, the functional forms of l~,m and l~ are the same. So we can rewrite the previous 
inequality using the definition of w2 in ( 4.1): 
From the concavity in l1 ofthe objective function in problem (4.2)-(4.5), we have that 
those first order conditions are increasing in l1 . So l~·m < l~ as stated. • 
Note that in the proof of Proposition 28 we have not required the concavity of the 
inefficient problem. Any stationary point, in particular any local or global optima, is 
characterized by underworking. From Proposition 27 we can say that the result is under-
working in any stage of the game. Again in our example the female decision is efficient17 . 
17For the case in footnote 15 wc have underworking for the wife also in intertemporal setting. 
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Remark 5 By induction, it is possible to show that, without remarriage then for every 
T stages dynamic game, the husband labor supply decision lr;" is less than the Pareto 
optimal one in any stage. 
Case B: Remarriage is Allowed Remark 5 seems quite strong result. The assump-
tion of no-remarriage makes the problem quite simple but seems in contrast with some 
recent empirica! fact documented by Schor[121). We should incorporate remarriage op-
portunities in our analysis. For simplicity, assume that human capitai accumulation 
increases the probability of matching another partner because of high earning capacities. 
In particular suppose that once an agent is married the utility is deterministic (no exoge-
nous probability of divorce), but when divorced the agent enters in the marriage market. 
The agent is small compared with the (marriage) market and the equilibrium is such 
that agent i has probability Àw~ of rernarrying (state s = l) and probability (l - Àw~) 
of rernaining alone (state s = 0), obviously ). is such that O ::::; Àw~ ::::; l. Note that in 
this case (B) the wage affects also the probability of getting the surplus y2 deriving from 
(re)n1arriage. The pararneter y2 will be the driving force of the result in Proposition 2918 . 
\Vhen y2 is high, then the agents bave a strong incentive to work hardly during the first 
stage in orcler to accumulate human capitai and to increase the probability of receiving 
part of the remarriage surplus y2 . 
In this new (stochastic) environment, while taking stage 1labor decision l~ the agent 
faces the following problem: 
( 4.19) 
Let's focus again on agent m's problem. For the husband um is given by (4.13). The 
only difference fron1 case (A) is that now the value function of agent m while divorced 
Dm( w?]"'-) is substituted by the o ne derived taking into account remarriage opportunities: 
18 A more accurate analysis should take into account assortative mating considerations in an equi-
librium modcl of marriage market. For simplicity we have, further, ignorecl the possibility of positive 
correlatimi between agents' wage levels. 
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By the envelope theorem: 
rvm 
"' d D (w2\ l) 
dw2 
(l- T 1(.))z;·m = (1- T 1(.)) lz (w~) ( 4.24) 
an d 
rvffi 




where lz (.) and l2 (.) defined, respectively by (4.11) and (4.6). Substituting (4.24), 
(4.25) into (4.21) and rearranging terms, we obtain: 
dVD,m(w2t) 
dw2 
À [D m (w~, l)- D m (W~, O)] + 
+Àw;1 [(l- T 1(.)) ~(w~) -l2 (w;1 )] + lz(w~), (4.26) 
noticc the first term is by assun1ption positive and its magnitude depends on Yz but, 
by Proposition l, the second term is negative. A t an interi or solution, the level fh is the 
one that satisfies ( 4.20) for the optimal level z;·m = l~· m = l?. Under concavity, ( 4.20) is 
also sufficient for the solution. The existence of such fj2 is given by construction. Set: 
( 4.27) 
rv 
Note lz(.) and l2 (.) (defined by (4.11) and (4.6), respectively) are both evaluated at 
the efficient level of second stage wage w 2 because l7: is chosen efficiently and we started 
by the same initial condition w7: = w1. The idea of the result is as follows. From ( 4.26) 
) 
dVD,rn(wrn) 
together with (4.22), (4.23), (4.24) and (4.25) we have that in (4.20 only dw2' 2 
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depends on y2 and is increasing. In particular for any fixed levell"{" the only element that 
r-..Jffi 
depends on y2 is D (w2\ l) from (4.22). So the first part of proposition is proved. 
Now start from y2 = fh an d consider the necessary and sufficient conditi o n ( 4.20) a t 
the Pareto optimal solution for l"{": 
where \ìD,m(.) is yD,m(w ) evaluated at y~). If y > y-" then dVD,m(w2 ) > dVD,m(w2 ) when lm 
2 - 2 2 dw2 dw2 l 
is held constant. From the concavity of the problem in l"{" the expression in the left hand 
si de of the previous equation is decreasing in li_n. So, with y2 > fh, in or der to obtain 
again equality to zero l"{" has to increase above the initial level lr = l~, m = l?. This 
proves the second part of the proposition. • 
Note that there is a cavcat in tbc prcvious proof. In ordcr to obtain tbc Pareto 
optimal labor clccision we neccl to check if fh guarantees enough surplus so that both 
agcnts want to get married. Note, ho,\·ever, that this participation constraint does not 
preclude the overworking result. Wc can always choose bigger y2 so that there are both 
gains from marriage ancl inefficiently high labor supply. We will see in section 3 that for 
any positive level of y2 , the \vife will overwork. 
vVe believe the conditions for overworking in the moclel presentecl in this section are 
minimal, for example, the introduction of household production will change the specificity 
investment character of the labor time toward overworking. 
In the light of the results in this section we can identify three classes of reasons for 
which people may \vant to work more than the optimal. First, Proposition 27 suggests 
that in a static environment there is no room for overworking. This result can be extended 
to any intertemporal framework if t h ere are no human capi tal accumulation opportunities, 
in particular it's easy to see that if %1~ = O, then any T stages problem will merely 
reproduce a T-repetition of the result in Proposition 27 (even with remarriage). 
Second, comparing the results in Proposition 28 and 29 we have noted that human 
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capitai accumulation alone is not enough. We believe the overworking result emphasizes 
the importance of soci al norms in determining agents behavior. The existence of a signif-
icant remarriage market is already an assumption about social norms. If divorced agents 
were particularly stigmatized by society, then the remarriage market will be practically 
inexistent. In particular we can focus on three objects which determine the result in 
Proposition 29: w2 , À and {3. Our way of modelling (re)marriage market implies earning 
power w2 is socially relevant. We know that in some societies job position is not im-
portant only for earning capacities. A good job is also a "soci al signal" an d we bave 
incorporate this features in our modeP 0 . The parameter À is linked with the proportion 
of singles on the total. From equation ( 4.27) we can say the remarriage effect is more 
important in societies where there is an high number of singles also in the middle age. 
The i1nportance of the parameter {3 is subtle, but i t is easy to imagine strong patriarchal 
society in which Pareto optimal decisions can be in1plemented by a dictatorial husband 
that Ìlnposes wife actions and decides household resourccs allocation20 . 
The third class of reasons is more technical and is linked with the limitations In 
marriage agrecments in an unverifiable information environment. Wc belicve the first 
two classes of reasons describe quite well the US environment. In the follo\ving section 
wc develop the contractual aspects comparing the effects of two particular divorce rules 
historically related to US. 
4.3 A Policy Exercise: The Change in Divorce Law 
In this section we \vill consider the implication of two different divorce laws on household 
time allocations. First we analyze the no-fault divorce model. In pure no-fault divorce 
states either spouse is allowed to initiate divorce unilaterally; actually most US states 
adopt the no-fault formula for divorcc and the model of section 2 is consistent with the 
1uln this wc follow Cole et al.[33](see for example their vVealth-Is-Status Equilibrium). 
20 f..Iore rigorously, Aghion et al. [4] show how efficient decisions can be implemcnted in incomplete 
contract situations when thc bargaining power is all allocateci to one agent. 
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unilateral decision. After that, we wili present the fault divorce model. Before 1970 in 
ali US states divorce required either mutuai consent or proof of "fault'' in an adversary 
proceeding21 . 
\Ve \vili show that, while with common consensus agents can implement Pareto opti-
mal labor decisions, the results presented in section 2 show that no-fault divo ree causes 
inefficient t ime aliocations. In particular, in the lights of the results in Proposition 29 of 
previous section we would expect that a change from fault to no-fault divorce increases 
labor supply. 
During 70s female labor-force-participation rate rose while real wage growth rate feli. 
Labor economists tried to explain this anomaly with the increase in the probability of 
divorce occurred after the gender revolution. However, Peters[lOl] found that a woman 
who lived in a no-fault divorce state did not face a higher probability to divorce than a 
won1an living in a fault divorce law state. Nloreover, Peters used a Probit moclel to show 
that liYing in a no-fault divorce state increases the probability to participate in the labor 
market by two percentage points. We believe the results in this section give a formai 
explanation to those empirical findings22 . 
As an inclependent result, in this section, it is shown that marriage contracts, under 
the two divorce laws, have an important normative property. In both regimes divorce is 
efficient, i.e. divorce occurs when the joint value of marriage is less then the sum of the 
values of opportunities which are faced by each spouse when divorcing. 
21 In 1970, California was the first state to adopt the no-fault approach to divorce. Other ten states 
went to no fault divorce before 1974. Between 1970 to 1985, all the American jurisdictions enhanced 
some form of no-fault divorce. 
22 Peters conjectured women increased labor supply because were worried about no t being compensateci 
for marriage specific investments in case of divorce. However, Parkman[98] showed that this was not 
the ca5e. The effect of the change in divorce law on labor supply differed across woman depending on 
human capitai accumulation possibilities. 
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4.3.1 The Basic Model: No-Fault Divorce 
Recall briefiy the model presented in Section 2 (case B). We will focus on wife's stage l 
decisions. At the beginning of stage l agent f solves: 
( 4.28) 
where, ex-post renegotiation, implies: 
( 4.29) 
an d: 
allowing remarriagc tbc valuc function is givcn by: 
Assuming concavity and interiority, the necessary and sufficient condition is: 
(4.30) 
,...,f f 
where l2 (w{) = dD (~2 '0 ) = dD' C/{) = dV(w}), and comes from applying the envelope dw2 dw2 dw2 
theorem to (4.8). As long as (1-(3)y2 >-T(.), from the concavity ofthe problem (4.28)-
( 4.29), we will have overworking for the wife23 . The previous discussion is the proof of 
Propositi o n 29 for agent f. 
In what follows we will present an optimality property of the marriage contract in 
23 Note that in our model we assumed y2 positive so as long as ,6>.. > O wife's labor decisions are 
inefficient. 
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our basic model. Ex-post renegotiation implies efficient divorce. As long as there are 
ex-post (aggregate) gains from marriage agents will redistribute those gains renegotiating 
the initial division and remain married. 
Definition 13 Efficient divorce occurs if and only if: 
where TG stay for total gains: 
an d ~~v m, ~~V f are the ( ex-post) outside opportunities. 
Remark 6 With no-fault regime divorce is efficient. 
Looking at (4.29) (and (4.13) for the husband) we can see that the individua! ra-
tionality condition ui ~ Wi, i = m, f defines also to an efficient divorce rule. Agents 
divorce if and only if the expression in square brackets is negative, which corresponds to 
the condition that total marriage gains TG= 11 + b ( J\!1( w2, wt) + F( w~\ wt)) be less 
then the sum of (ex-post) outside opportunities ~~vm +W f. 
4.3.2 The "Fault" Divorce Model 
Consider the same problem as the one defined is Section 2. The only difference is that 
no\v agents face a different divorce rule. The so-called fault divorce law. We should 
define formally what it is meant for this term. Since i t was almost never possible to show 
one partner's "fault'' then the US divorce law prior 1970 was in fact a regime of mutua[ 
consent. 
Definition 14 Under mutua[ consent regime, agents divorce if both agree on divorce. 
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If Iaw requires mutuai consent, some kind of severance pay or compensation at divorce 
will be necessary to convince the partner to agree on divorce. The following proposition 
summarizes the main resuit of this section. With mutuai consent, agents can impiement 
the first best Iabor and divorce decisions. 
Proposition 30 Under mutual consent agents can implement the Pareto optimal labor 
decision z;,o, i = m, j, t = l, 2. Moreover divorce is efficient, i. e. there will be divorce in 
the first stage if an d only if um + uf = TG < wm + W f and in the second stage if and 
only if c2 + c{ < 02 + o{ 
Proof. To prove efficiency of Iabor decisions. Suppose spouses agree on an ex-ante 
transfer scheme T~ i =m, J; t= l, 2 which clivides the (expected) totai gains in the two 
stages y and y2 (Tr +T{= Yt;t = 1,2)2·1• Since we have seen in problem (4.2)-(4.5) 
of scction 2 that this is precisely the \vay wc implement the Pareto optimal decisions, 
thcn it will suffice to show that there will be no ex-post renegotiation. Equivalently we 
show that the ex-post division cannot be different from the ex-ante division. Start from 
the beginning of stage two bargaining section. Agent f has already decided her Iabor 
decision in current stage l{, and, from the ex-ante agreed division, without renegotiation, 
her consumption level \viU be c{ = w{ l{+ T{. Sin ce wife must agree o n divorce then f will 
accept a new divisi o n oniy if the new consumption Ievei c{ satisfy ~ 2 c{. Simiiarly the 
ex-post renegotiated outcome for m has t o satisfy 22 2:: c2. Those two conditions together 
with the constraint 22 +c{ :::; 12 =w{ l{+ w2l2 +T{+ T2 = w{l{ + w2l2 + Y2 impiy 
an ex-post bargaining process outcome, whiie married: c{ =c{ and 22 =~m. Following 
a similar argument it is easy to show that at the beginning of stage l bargaining section 
agents cannot change ex-ante division um, uf of total gains TG, i.e. um = um and 
v/ = uf. This proves the first p art of the proposition. 
24 In general, the transfers does no t ha ve to be nonnegative, however the transfer scheme is not un-
constrained. Since T~ are decided ex-ante, then they should satisfy the participation constraints at the 
beginning of each stage. 
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To prove efficient divorce. First, assume um+uf =TG< Wm+ Wl ifboth wm > um 
and Wl> uf then we are clone, otherwise w.l.o.g. suppose wm < um and Wl> uf, then 
agent m can compensate f with a positive transfer pm = wm-um+,B [TG- wm +W'] 
in order to convince ber to agree on divorce. He will gain ,B [TG- wm +Wl] and the 
wife \vill agree because her divorce payoff Wf + pm = uf + (1- ,B) [wm + Wf- TG] 
is strictly greater then the marriage payoff uf, so they will divorce. Note we use ,B an d 
(1- ,8) to share divorce gains because we assume the bargaining position during marriage 
is the same as the one in case of divorce. Now suppose um + uf = TG ~ wm +W f. Since 
cannot be t ha t bot h wm > um an d W f > uf then we should show there no t exists a 
compensation schen1e that leads to divorce. Again assume the situation is wm < um and 
Wl > 1/. The ma..ximum that agent mis disposed to offer is, pm = wm- um, however 
now lV f + pm = l:Vm + vV f - TG + uf ::=:; uf, assuming that with indifference agents 
prefer ren1ain married, then f will not accept they will remain married. For the second 
stage the proof is very much the same. • 
In Proposition 30 we showed that if divorce requires mutuai consent then there is 
no roon1 for ex-post rencgotiation and family labor dccisions are Pareto optimal. This 
result ha ve a more generai interpretation. It emphasizes the importance of the assumption 
of unilateral resolution in incomplete contracts literature (see Hart and Moore[61]). If 
contracts cannot be easily resolved then it is possible to implement Pareto effi.cient levels 
of (specific) investment. 
The main implication of the present section analysis is that the change in divorce 
law caused ineffi.ciencies in labor decisions. So the natural (though puzzling) question 
is: "why was there this change ?" One may be tempted to answer t ha t previous fault 
law imposed too much constraints on agents' behavior. However, in Proposition 30 we 
showed that with common consensus divorce was efficient. 
An independent result is Remark 6. The marriage contract in our (no-fault) basic 
model has an important property of optimality. With ex-post renegotiation divorce will 
be optimal. 
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Finally, our model suggests that the change in divorce law should affect intra-household 
resource allocation. Under fault divorce the within family allocations depend on the ex-
ante partners' position, with no-fault divorce what matters is the ex-post position. Apart 
from the normative importance of this result, it would be interesting to check empirically 
if this redistributive effect was important. 
4.4 Conclusions 
As indicated by its title, this paper tries to explain some aspects of labor supply deci-
sions in intertemporal setting using a contractual approach to marriage. In particular 
we analyze the effect of a particular kind of transaction costs on household dynamic 
labor decisions. In our model, consistently with the incomplete contracts literature, en-
forceability problems in within family arrangements cause inefficiencics in labor decision 
because of ex-post renegotiation. 
vVe find sufficient conditions under which agents tend to work harder than the Pareto 
efficient level. To explain overworking three elements seem to be important. A relative 
symmetric situation between partners, the existence of remarriage opportunities and the 
social relevance of earning capacity. vVith this interpretation in mind we can give a 
normative explanation of some recent empirica! findings about overworked Americans 
reported by Schor(121]. 
The contractual interpretation appears to be particularly effective while analyzing 
the effect of the 70s' change in US divorce law on woman labor force participation rate. 
We show that the change from fault to no-fault divorce law introduces problems of en-
forceability in familiar contractual arrangements creating the possibility of ex-post re-
contracting. This result seems consistent with the empirica! findings of Peters(lOl) and 
Parkman(98]. 
I t should be emphasized that the role of human capitai accumulation as posed in this 
paper rests on the presumption that partners threaten to divorce in order to renegotiate 
104 
previous arrangements. In principle it is possible that the agents use a different threat 
point during the bargaining section. However, the empirica! problems for the identifica-
tion of the threat point are already well kno\vn in efficient bargaining models of labor 
supply (see Lundberg and Pollak[82]). 
The model presented in this paper is deliberately simplified in a number of ways in 
order to highlight the implications of the enforceability problems in an intertemporal set-
ting. In future research i t \vould be desirable to relax some of the simplifying assumptions 
in order to enrich its empirical applicability and relevance to policy. Several areas for 
future development are: (1) incorporation of household production; (2) introduction of 
collective consumed household goods such as children, housing and location; (3) consid-
erations of the impact of property assignments and welfare programs into intra-household 
resource allocations; ( 4) explicit introduction of uncertainty and analysis of the risk shar-
ing between (risk advcrse) partners; (5) more complete treatment of rencgotiation-proof 
equilibria, analyzing the rolc of reputation into family sctting; (6) introduction of an equi-
librium trcat1nent of marriage and remarriagc decisions; (7) analysis of the relationship 
bctween intertemporal time allocations, marriage contracts and fertility decisions. 
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Chapter 5 
Moral Hazard and Career Concerns 
The Trade-Off Between Incentives, Intertemporal Con-
sumption Smooting and Human Capitai Insurance: 
Some Preliminary Results 
5.1 Introduction 
Empirica! findings about high skilled people wage dynamics can be summarized as fol-
lows (Baker et al. (1994) [13](14]). (i) Internai labor market: actual wage differs from 
expected productivity and employers are shielded against changes in external marked 
conditions. (ii) Serial correlation: after controlling for observable characteristics, wages 
remain serially correla t ed an d t h ere are predictable winners an d losers ( Chiappori et al. 
(30]). (iii) Increasingness: after controlling for observable human capitai accumulation, 
wages increase with tenure (Medoff and Abraham (1980)[89) and Lazear (1979)[77]). (iv) 
Performance link: wages are linked with past performance, in particular, there is evidence 
of both wage bonus and wage cuts. 
None of the existing models can, alone, account for all those stylized facts1. Seems 
natural to propose a model of moral hazard with long term contracts and career concerns, 
1 In this respect see Baker et al.[13]'s discussion. 
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however the literature lacks of a systematic theoretical analysis of such model. The first 
objective of the present Chapter is to analyze the introduction of long term contracts 
into the career concerns framework of Holmstrom (1982)[64]. The second objective is to 
perform such analysis with a relatively simple model which can both be tested empirically 
and used as a possible benchmark for future extensions. Here, we propose a general-
equilibrium recursive-contracts model that accounts for the mentioned stylized facts. As 
a by-product we found a closed form solution for the infinitely repeated moral hazard 
model with log utility agent. 
The main results of our analysis are the following. (i) Intertemporal inefficiency. The 
optimal long term contract with repeated moral hazard implies that the inverse of the 
marginai utiiity follows a martingale. One effect of the introduction of the career concern 
is to destroy this intertemporal optimaiity condition forcing the principal to offer an wage 
schemc in which the agent continuation vaiue is non decreasing. The optimai contract 
gives decreasing expected profits to the finn and increasing agent's wages. This can be 
seen an extension of the downward rigid wage scheme found by Harris and Holmstrom 
(1982) [58]2. (ii) Informational effect. With linear production function an d additive nor-
mally distributed random shocks none action is more informative than another. But, in 
generai, in a repeated relationship a new effect emerges and the Holmstrom (1982)[64]'s 
transient effect result3 can be reversed. Principal and agent can be both interested in 
implementing a low levei action if this is sufficiently informative. They may agree on 
sacrificing today benefits for having, tomorrow, a more remunerative contract continua-
tion with Iow noise. This result has some relationship with the works of Dewatripont et 
al. (1997)[38] and Aron (1987)[9]. (iii) Estimation. The recursive structure of the model 
allows both numericai simulation and empiricai verification. 
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) [53] introduce short-term linear contracts in a model 
of career concerns where individuals have no preference for intertemporai consumption 
2See also Phelan (1993)[102] and Chiappori et al. (1995)[30]. 
3 The effect is that career concerns induce high effort at the beginning of the career. 
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smoothing. First, one objective of the present work is the analysis of the intertemporal 
ine:fficiency induced by the presence of career concerns in a dynamic principal agent 
relationship. So we introduce more realistic preferences where agents want to smooth 
consumption across time. Second, the main implication of the Gibbons et al.'s short-
term contracts analysis is that actual wage equals expected productivity in each period. 
But this contrasts with the evidence of internallabor market (point (i) above). Third, 
their motivation for short term contract is theoretically non convincing4 • Finally, by 
assuming linear technology with additive normally distributed shock, Gibbons et al. 
loose completely our informational effect. 
Another related paper is Harris and Holmstrom (1982)[58]. They analyze long term 
insurance contracts in presence of career concerns. However, one unpleasant implication 
of their model in the absence of wage cuts ( point (iv) above). This is due to the absence 
of incentive motivations in their insurancc model. 
Finally, the analysis ofthe present Chapter is related to Phclan (1993 and 1994)[102][103] 
\vho focused on the repeated moral hazard model with exponential utility agent. Phelan 
(1993) analyzes the repeated moral hazard with one sided commitment, \Vhile Phelan 
(1994) introduces i.i.d. shocks into an overlapping generations model of moral hazard. 
First, in Phelan's works career concerns motives are completely absent. Second, one 
advantage of our approach is that, in contrast with Phelan (1993), we are able to show 
directly that wages increase with tenure. 
The Chapter is focused on the case where the agent has logarithmic utility and is 
organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the infinitely repeated moral hazard model 
and we derive a closed form solution for the optimal wage scheme. In Section 3 we 
develop the analysis of the career concerns model. We remark that our results are at a 
preliminary stage. In Section 3 we focus o n the two (periods) by two ( efforts) by two 
.tThey claim that renegotiation-proof contracts are short-term. In fact we will show that the reason 
for which thc long tenn contract can be formulateci in a recursive fonn is prccisely because we move 
along thc Pareto frontier, so there are no Pareto improving rencgotiation opportunities, i.e. the long 
ter7n contract is renegotiation-proof (both in according to Farrell an d rv!askin (1989) [42] an d Pearce 
(1987)[99] definitions). 
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( outputs) case; to give intuitions about more generai cases we use remarks. Section 4 
concludes. 
5.2 The Repeated Moral Hazard 
The Section presents a closed form solution for the infinitely repeated moral hazard model 
with risk neutra! principal and log utility agent. 
To our knowledge there is only one other case for which a closed form solution to 
the infinite horizon case is known: when the agent bave exponential utility. Our model 
can be used to study long run implications for decreasing absolute risk adverse agents, 
rnoreover the simplicity of the model rnakes it useful for extensions to more cornplicate 
environments (like our analysis in prcscnce of carecr conccrns madc in Section 5.3). 
5.2.1 The Sequential Problem. 
This is an cxamplc of thc repeated moral hazarcl model of Chaptcr 3. At the beginning of 
the relationship (t = 0), the agent offers an incentive compatible contract to the principal. 
The horizon in infinite ancl, in each periocl t, the agent chooses an unobservable action 
a(t) E {aL, au} which costs, in terms of utilitics, C(aiJ = c ancl C(a11 ) = c, \vith c > c. 
The action affects the probability distribution of output realizations y(t) E {Y,JL} with 
y > }!_· The probability of high output realization is p( a), with p(au) =p and p( aL) =p 
(p > p). The principal is risk neutral an d the agent is risk adverse with instantaneous 
utility function u(w(t),a(t)) = EP(a(t)) [log(w(t))]- C(a(t)), where EP(a) is the expected 
value operator with probability distribution p(a). The intertemporal discount factor 
is for both agents (3 E (0, 1). A "fully defined" contract should specify actions and 
\vage payments uncler any contingency. The question we are concerned is in some sense 
a little bit different from the one of cletermining the optimal action ancl the optimal 
payment together. We are concerned with the form of an optimal incentive-compatible 
wage scheme. Noting that a pure insurance contract implements tbc low action au, wc 
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assume the principal-planner wants to implement the high action aH in any period and 
we focus our analysis o n the form of the optimal wage contract W = {w t (h t+ 1)} :o w h ere 
ht+l = (y(O), y(l), y(2), ... , y(t)) is the output history and h0 = 0. 
The value function V* is defined as follows: 
V*(7ro) 
sub 
su p v(ht-l, W, s) = (l - {3)EP [E~0{3t log (wt(ht)) J -c 
{wt(ht)}~0 
(1- {3)EP [E~0{3twt(ht)] + (1- {3)1r0 ::; EP [y], (5.1) 
v(ht, W, s) (1- {3)EP [E~=of3n log (wt+n(ht+l+n)) 1 ht] -c 
> (l- {3)EP [E~=of3n (log (wt+n(ht+l+n)) -C (at+n(ht+n))) 1 ht] 
v(ht~ W, S) VS(ht) Vht, t 2: O, (5.2) 
(5.3) 
whcrc s(h1') = {st+n(ht+n\ht)} ~=0 is a generic contingcnt plan of actions starting at thc 
beginning of period t, (the equilibrium s is such that St(ht) = au for any t and any 
history h t). Note, that, the action in peri od t is a function of h} history (indeed is taken 
at the beginning of the period, before period t output realization). vVe use the notation 
EP[. ' ht] for the conditional expectation operator with probability distribution on future 
histories induced by any possible deviation plan s. Analogously, EP [. 1 ht] is used for 
the conditional expectation operator when aH is implemented in any period ( equilibrium 
p l an s), an d EP [y] = EP [y 1 h t] = pfj + (l - p)]!.: In the above formulati an we used 
normalized payoffs to emphasize the repeated nature of the game. Finally, note that, in 
the terminology of Chapter 3 we are looking for sequentially incentive contracts, i.e. for 
contracts t ha t are incentive compatible after any output history h t. 
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5.2.2 The Recursive Formulation and the Closed Form Solu-
t io n. 
The problem appears quite complicateci. But, using the approach of Abreu Pierce and 
Stacchetti (1990) [3] and Spear and Srivastava (1988) [126] we can reformulate i t in a 
simpler way. Specifically \Ve show the optimal contract W is recursive in the following 
sense: if a principal starts with an expected discounted profit of 1r0 and subsequently 
has history ht (which gives him an expected discounted profit from t on of 1rt(ht) ), the 
continuation of W could be as well as if i t were the first period of an oo periods contract 
in which the principal is assured to receive 1rt(ht). 
~-·· 
Proposition 31 An optùnal contract W satisfies the following Bellman Equation: 
V(1f) = hfa2:-w,1Q,T.,B:P[(l- !3) log(w) + /3V(n)]+(l-p) ((1- /3) log(w) + /3V(zr)]-(l-,8)c 
sub: 
(p- p) [(l- ,8) log(w) + ,BV(n)- (1- /3) log(w)- ,BV(zr)] > (c- c)(l- /3) 
pw + (l - p) w + 1r - ,8 [p n + (l - p) zr] < E [y] 
w,w > o. 
(5.4) 
Proof. Given the stationarity of the problem we can use most of the analysis of Chapter 
3. vVhat has to be shown is that for each history h t the optimal contract solves a second-
best optimal contract. So, suppose we bave an optimal contract W which specifies profits 
1rt(ht) for the principal5 and continuation utilities v(ht, W, s) for the agent. 
5Throughout the Section we write the continuation profits for the optimal contract W as: 
00 
1r(V(h1) = 7rt(ht) =L {3 11 EP [y(t +n)- w(t +n) 1 h1], 
n=O 
where the random variable w(t +n) are induced by W (and the optimal action pian s). 
111 
~t. The ZtS are choose such that to maintain the incentive compatibility in period t. So 
Zt, and ~t must satisfy: 
The agent's log-utility implies that a sufficient condition for keeping incentive compati-
bility is to use: 
- (ht l -) - Wt - 'y, y 
Zt = R~t where R = _ (ht-l - ) 
Wt ,Y._,Y._ 
(5.5) 
Note that this expression is well defined because under this contingency the contract W 
Inust specify strictly positive wages otherwise cannot be v(ht- 1, y_, W, S) > v(ht- 1, y_, W, s) 
(indeed with zero wage v(ht-l, y_, W, S) = -oo). :rvioreover note that from the fact that 
the wage has to be strictly greater than zero wc bave, R 2:: O, vvith R = l in case of full 
insurance. In period t the promised discounted expected profit is increased at least by 
EP [zt] , i.e. n~ = 1ft+ EP [zt] . Is this surplus that we are going use to increase the period 
t- l wage Wt_ 1 (ht- 1 , y). To control for period t- l incentive compatibility it is useful 
to rewrite 
(1- {3) [plog (wt_ 1(ht- 1,y)) + (1- p)log (wt-l(ht-1,y_))- c]+ 
+ {3 [pv ( (h t-l, y), W, s) + (l - p) v ( (h t- 1 , y_), W, s)] 
If we call w' and 32.' the modified wages and continuation utilities, then: 
_, 
w (ht-l -) Wt-1 , Y + Zt-l 
p [log (wt(ht-l, Jb y)) - log (wt(ht-l, }!_, y)- zt)] + (5.6) 
+(1- p) [log (wt(ht- 1 ,JL,JL)) -log (wt(ht- 1,]!_,]!_)- ~t)] 
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Thus, to maintain the incentive compatibility in period t - l it suffices to have: 
log(w')- !312.' = log (wt_1(ht-1,y))- f3v((ht- 1,J1), W,s) 
or: 
(5.7) 
now note that from (5.6) and from the incentive compatible decision of Zt we have. 
(v' - v (h t , W, s)) v((ht-1,J1), W,S)- v((ht-1,y_), W,s)- (v((ht- 1,1!_), W,S)- 12.') 
( 
wt(ht-1,y,y) ) 
t6.v - log _ ( t- 1 =) . (5.8) w t h ' y_, y - ;_t 
In order to keep unchangcd the principal's expected discounted profits we cannot increase 
the pcriod t - l wagc more than: 
1-p 1-p 
Zt-1 = {3--EP [zt] = {3--A(R);..t 
p p 
(5.9) 
where A(R) = l+ p(R -l) >O. The second equality comes from the fact we have chosen 
~t and Zt according to (5.5). Rearranging together (5. 7),(5.8) and (5.9) wc have: 
(5.10) 
( 
t-1 - ) ( wt(ht-1 'Jf_, y) ) 
=log Wt_1(h ,y) +f3t6.v-{3log (ht-1 -)-w t ' Jj_' y ;_t 
note that in (5.10) the left hand side is increasing in ;_t and starts below the right hand 
side which is deceasing in ~t· It is easy to see that exists a ;_t with Wt(ht- 1 , '}!_, y) >;_t > O 
su eh that satisfies the equality in ( 5 .lO). Moreover this has t o happen sufficiently near 
zero, indeed, ~t cannot be such that t6.v -log (- ~;~~t:l,y)y) ) ~ O otherwise since ~t > O 
Wt t ,y_,y -~t 
and the left hand side is increasing starting from log (wt_ 1 (ht- 1 , y)) this ;_t cannot satisfy 
the equation. So we h ave v' 2:: v ( ht- 1 , '}!_, W, s) which, together vvith ;_t > O implies a n et 
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gain for the agent. This give the contradiction we are looking for. The originai contract 
W cannot be optimal. In period zero the agent could have offered this new contract to 
the princi pal instead of W, an d stay better. • 
According to the Bellman's principle, if we knew the value function V* (.) then the 
agent's problem would be the to choose wages and continuation profits so that to solve 
the extended static program (5.4). 
Can be verified directly that a solution to the functional equation (5.4) is: 
V(7r) 
B 
log (EP [y] - (l - /3)1r) + B 
l c-c 
---log(Ap(k)) +p--A- C 
1-/3 p-p 
l+ p(k- l) 
exp --A (l- /3) , {
c- c } 
p-p 
the implied optirnal wages and profits plans are: 
k (l-p)(k-l) p 
- A(k) 11 - (l-f3)A(k) E [y] 
l p(k- l) p 
A(k) 7r + (l - f3)A(k) E [y] 
k 
A(k) (EP [y] - (l - f3)7r) 
l 
A(k) (EP [y]- (1- /3)7r). 
Finally, note some characteristics of the policies: 
an d 






The function V (.) is strictly concave an d is defined only for 1r < ~~[~) . It is well 
known the possibility of multiple solution to the functional equation (5.4). So our 
next target is to show that the given function V (.) is actually the value function for 
the problem. To prove the result we adapt some known theorem (see Stokey and Lu-
cas (1989)(127] or Cugno and Montrucchio (1998)(36]) to our model. Let us to intro-
duce some useful notation. Denoted 7r - 7rW- { 1r[V(ht)} :
1 
the contingent plan of 
profits starting from 1r0 , implied by the incentive compatible wage contract W, where 
1r[V(ht) = 1ft(ht) = L~=O {3n EP [y(t +n)- Wt+n(ht+l+n) 1 ht]. Note there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the profits and wage contingent plans. So, for any feasible path 
( which is given by an incentive cornpatible contract) we call: 
Because of the boundedness of resources, the limiting seri es is well defined ( although may 
be -oo ), thus, we are allowed to write 
Now we are ready to prove the main result of this section. 
Proposition 32 V ( 1r) = V* ( 1r), far any 1r < (~~[~~. 
vVe start with proving two lemmas. 
Lemma 3 Far any feasible plan 7r starting fram an arbitrary initial 1r0 < ~~[~~ we have 
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Proof. Fixed 1r0 , the boundedness of resources gives easily the result. • 
Lemma 4 For any feasible plan 7r starting from an arbitrary initial 1r0 there exist a fea-
sible p l an n' starting from 1r0 su eh that U ( 7ro, n') 2: U ( 7ro, n) an d lim su p {3N EP [V ( 1r~)] 2: 
o. 
Proof. Divide the feasible paths in two subclasses (that exhaust the possibilities). The 
one for which as N----+ oo, EP[UN(7ro, n)] converges to a finite number and the ones for 
which EP[UN(7r0 , n)] goes to minus infinity. For the last class we can use as n' the wage 
path Ìlnplied by our solution to the functional equation V(.) ( our proposed policy) which 
trivially satisfies V(1r0 ) = Ep[U(1r0 , n')] 2: EP[U(1r0 , n)]= -oo. Iv1oreover note that our 
proposed policy has limit 
The first inequality comes from the fact tbat the rigbt band side represents the lowest 
possible payoff, since we bave used thc wagc path according to (5.12) and EP[.] is the 
unconditional expectation. 
For tbe converging sequences we can show that anyone rnust bave lim inf {3N E;;[V(7rN )] 2: 
O. So it suffice to take n =n'. To prove the statement note that, any feasible path, from 
the participation constraint we have 
taking logs and using Jensen's inequality we get 
the last strict inequality comes from the fact that we are analyzing the convergent sub-
classes of paths. This inequality is maintained also in the limit by the same reason. But 
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then, since B is a constant, we have for any feasibie pian: 
lim sup {3N [log (EP [y]- (l- {3)1rN) + B] 2:: O 
N~oo 
vVeighting this result by ali the possibie probabilities of such paths does not change this 
inequality and we have the result. • 
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 32. 
Proof. (of Proposition 32) First, since V(.) satisfies the functional equation then, by 
the sup properties, for any c > O, we can always construct a feasible plan that starts 
from 1r0 such that for any N satisfies: 
(5.15) 
vVith li1n 8N =c. So, taking limits to (5.15) as N goes to infinity and using Lemina 3 we 
havc V(7ro) ~ U(1r0 , 1r) +c. Since c were arbitrary then the inequality V(7ro) ::; V*(7ro) 
is proved. 
To show the other inequality we use again the fact that V(.) satisfies the Bellman 
equation. From that we have V(1r0 ) 2:: UN(7ro,7r)+f3NEP[V(7rN)] for any feasible plan 
and for any N. From Lemma 4 we have that V(1r0 ) 2:: U(1r0 , 1r') 2:: U(7ro, 1r) for any 
feasible pian. This implies the desired inequality V ( 1r0 ) 2:: V* ( 7ro). • 
5.3 The Career Concerns Model 
In this Section -vve present some preiiminary results. To keep some order we decided to 
present the working example (for which we can give a structured anaiysis) and to use 
remarks for the extensions to more generai cases. Throughout the section, we remain 
into the log-utility case. Further we state our results for the two-period case remarking 
that- as frequently occurs- by induction it is possibie to extend the analysis to any finite 
T-period case. 
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5.3.1 The Working Example 
W e consider a modification of a two periods repeated m or al-hazard problem. A t the 
beginning of the relationship many principals compete for an agent offering a long term 
contract to the agent. Given the wage contract W the agent chooses unobservable actions, 
a(O) in the first and a(l) in the second period. At the end of each period there is output 
realization y(t) and wage payments w( t), t = O, l. Note, in order to remain consistent 
with the notation in the thesis our first period is period O (as a time index). 
The career concerns model departs from the usual repeated moral hazard in two 
respects. First, i t is assumed t ha t a t the beginning of the second peri od ( after first 
period wage payments are made) the agent can leave the firm an d accept a more profitable 
contract from the Inarket. This limited-commitment assumption impedes the firm to have 
positive profits under some contingency. Second, at the beginning of the relationship 
t h ere is symmetric but impcrfect information about worker's ability T) (or quality of thc 
match). There is a cmn1non prior on TJ whose distribution can be characterized by the 
vector of parameters v0 . To keep our analysis simple we specify our model introducing 
the following set of assumptions. 
Assumptions (A) 
l. The agent utility is given by log(w)- C( a) with a E {aL, aH}. 
2. C (a L) = O an d C (a H) = c > O. 
3. The principal is risk neutral and his payoffs are y- w. 
4. The intertem por al discount factor is for bot h agents (3 < l. 
5. The agent can be of two types: "bad" (B) or "good" (G), 1.e. the productivity 
parameter8 T) E { G, B} 
l:iBecause of the imperfect but symmetric nature of the information about the productivity parameter, 
we could equivalently think 17 as an indicator of the quality of the match between the finn and the agent. 
Harris and Holmstrom (1982)[58] proposed to interpret 17 as an indicator of the level of agent's human 
capitai and the stochasticity of the posterior rcalization as shocks in the human capitai endowment. 
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6. Define v0 E [O, l] the prior probability of being good (G). 
7. The action affects the probability distribution of output realizations y E Y = {y, JL} 
with y >}L· 
8. Given a probability of being good v and the action a taken by the agent, the 
probability of high output realization is p( a, v), with p( aH, v) =p( v) and p( aL, v) = 
p( v). The probabilities are derived according top( a, v)= v J(G, a)+(l- v) J(B, a), 
where f(TJ, a) is the conditional probability of high output given the action taken 
is a and the productivity parameter is TJ. 
9. Natural restrictions are f(G, a) ::; J(B, a) for any action a, and f(TJ, aH)~ f(TJ, aL) 
for any TJ9 . 
Undcr assumptions (A), givcn a prior v0 , thc postcrior is dcfined by the following 





Z.!of( C, a(O)) 
vof( C, a(O)) + (l - v o) f(B, a(O)) 
v 0 (l- f(C, a(O))) 
v0 (l- f(G, a(O))) +(l- vo) (l- f(B, a(O))) · 
Back\vard solving requires starting \vith the second period problem. 
(5.16) 
(5.17) 
Period one Period l is the last one. For any realized output outcome y E Y and 
initial equilibrium action a(O) the learning rules (5.16)-(5.17) determine the posterior 
u. In equilibrium, the second period maximization problem can be summarized by the 
\JNote that, under our assumptions we have p(v) ~ p(v) for every v, and the folowing production 
matrix F 
F _ [ f(G,aH), f(G,aL) l 
- f(B,aH), f(B,aL) . 
120 
following value function 
V(1r, v) = max{a,wy} E [log(wy) l a, v]- C( a) 
sub: 
E [y - Wy l a, v] 2 1r 
E [log(wy) l a, v] 2 E [log(wy) l a, v] 
(5.18) 
where for each random variable X we denote E [Xy l a, v] p( a, v)X + (1- p( a, v))X. 
Problem (5.18) is the second period optimal (static) contract under the assumption that 
the posterior v is common knowledge. Note that the incentive compatibility characteristic 
of the contract guarantees that indeed, in equilibrium, v is common knowledge. 
Under our assumptions a solution to the problem is guaranteed (See the static model 
of Chapter 3); denote the optimal wage scheme by w;= w;(v, 1r), y = y, 1!.: 
Consider now the problem: 
W(1r, v, v)= maxE [log (w;(v, 1r)) l a, v] -C( a) 
a 
(5.19) 
where w;(v, 1r) are the solution to (5.18). Note that by definition vV(1r, v, v) = V(1r, v) 
and denote 0,* = 0,*(1r, v, iì) the solution to (5.19). The function W(1r, v, iì) is the maxi-
mum the agent can get in period l from his superior information according v. The optimal 
wage scheme w; (v, 1r) is derived by the optimal contract un der common knowledge of v. 
Note that the full-commitment assumption for the principal is important here. Indeed 
the wage are fixed at the beginning of period O. The reason we introduced this function 
will became clear in a moment. 
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The two period problem 
Now consider the problem in the periodO. Let us write the problem in recursive form 
maxa(O),wy,1ry E [log(wy) + {3V (ny, vy(a(O))) l a(O), vo]- C(a(O)) 
sub : (5.16)(5.17), 
E[(y-wy) +{3ny l a(O),vo] ~no, 
E [log(wy) + {3V (ny, vy(a(O))) l a(O), vo]- c~ 
~E [log(wy) + {3W (ny, vy(a(O)), vy(a(O))) l a(o), vo], 
1r y ::::; O, no = O. 
(5.20) 
Bayesian rules (5.16)(5.17) define the low of motion for v. The first constraint is the 
participation constraint; the second constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint. 
The nonpositivity constraints on the continuation expected profits 1r y summarize the 
effect of thc limitcd coininitmcnt characteristic of thc carcer concerns model. The agent 
cannot co1nmit to rcmain in the firm by more than one period. If at the beginning of the 
next period is possible to implement an incentive compatible contract that guarantees 
positive profits to the principal, then the worker will receive an outside offer from the 
market and will change firm. Lastly, competition among principals drives the initial 
expected profits to zero (no= 0). 
As in Harris and Holmstrom (1982)(58] we decided to define the problem as if i t were 
the agent who offers an incentive compatible contract. Indeed, competing principals 
imply that the agent has the whole bargaining power. We can assume the timing of 
the game be as follows: the agent offers the contract, the principal accepts or rejects 
it, the agent chooses the effort, the output is realized and the agent receives the agreed 
payments. The reason the agent is forced to offer an incentive compatible contract, is 
simply because the principal knows the agent will choose his action after the contract 
is accepted. An d, of course, the agent will choose the bes t action (given the contract). 
If the contract is not incentive compatible the principal will not believe in the proposal 
and will reject agent's offer. So the incentive compatibility constraint can be seen as a 
122 
credibility constraint under imperfect monitoring. 
Because ofthe function W (1ry, vy(a(O)), vy(a0 )), the problem can be really very com-
plicate, however: 
Assumption (B) 10 It is convenient t o implement in the second peri od the high effort 
action aH. 
Can be verified directly that, under assumption (B), the value functions are11 : 
V(1r, v) log (EP [y l v] - 1r) + B(v) (5.21) 
W(1r,v,v) log (EP [y l v] - 1r) + B(v) + D(v, v) 
w h ere 
B(v) 
c 
-log(Ap(k(v))) + p(v) ( ) "( ) -c p v -p v 
Ap(k(v)) l+ p(v)(k(v) - l) 
k(v) { c } exp " p(v) - p(v) 
D( v, v) 
p(v)- p(v) 
p(v) -p( v) c 
(5.22) 
Note that under full insurance, the optimal value is log (Efi [y l v]- 1r), thus B(v) 
surnmarizes the incentive costs of implementing aH. 
Proposition 33 Under assumptions (A) and (B), the optimal contract satisfies the 
10 In terms of primitives (B) amounts to assume that the parameters (c, Y, F) are such that there is a 
nonempty interval for the prior v 0 t ha t, given the induced posteri or, in the second peri od i t is convenient 
to implement aH, this for any first period output realization y(O). Together ·with the restriction that 
our analysis is for priors belonging to this interval. It is easy to see that (c, Y, F) could be chosen such 
that the interval be the whole (0, 1]. The case va= O is not interesting and, together with va= l, is a 
repeated case. 
11 The important simplification of assumption (B) is that the function D does not depends on the 
profits 1r (see the generai experession for the optimal solution to (5.19)). 
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following recursive problem: 
SUP{a(a),wy,7ry} E (log(wy) + f3V (1ry, vy(a(O))) l a(O), va]- C(a(O)) 
sub: {5.16}{5.17} 
E [(y- wy) + {37ry l a(O), va] ~ 7ra 
(p- p) [log (w)+ f3V (w, v) -log (w)- {3V (K,~)] ~c (l+ f3A(v,J!.., f;,Q)) 
1r y ::; O 1ra = O. 
with A(v,~, I;, Q)= pD(v, f;) +(l- p) D(Q,Q). 
Proof. From assumption (B), A(v,~, I;, Q) does not depend on 1r and is defined as in the 
proposition because from the left hand side of the participation constraint (5.20) we have 
E (log(w) + {3vV (1r, v(a(O)), I/(ii(O))) l ii(O), va]= E [log(w) + {3V (1r, v(a(O))) l ii(O), va]+ 
f3A(v, ~, r;, Q). Bccause of this lincar separability, we can focus on equilibrium histories. 
So consider the equilibriurn history (va, y(O), v) starting from the initial history va. The 
optimal two period contract W specifies actions a( O) = sa(va) and a( l) = s 1 (va, y(O), v) 
and payments w(O) = wa(va, y(O)) and w( l) = w 1 (va, y(O), v, y(l)). In particular, for 
any history (va, y(O), v), the contingent plan defines a continuation (expected) profits 
value 7r((va, y(O), v)) = E[y(l) - w(l) l a((va, y(O), v)), v]. From no\v on our strategy 
of proof is similar to the one of Proposition 31. We seeks to show that (5.18) has 
to hold for any history (va,y(O),v) if\ve fix 1ry = 7r(va,y,vy)· As before we show the 
statement by contradiction. We show that if, after some history (va, y(O), v), is possible 
to obtain a payoff higher than the utility obtained by the agent in period 2 under the 
optimal contract W, say U*(va, y(O), v) = E[log(w(l)) l a(l), v]- C(a(l)), by offering 
an incentive compatible contract that guarantees 1r(v0 , y, vy) to the principal, then W 
cannot be an optimal contact. So assume that, there exist a contract W (not necessary 
optimal) that, after some history (va, y, vy), gives to the agent an higher utility fJ > U* 
with an incentive compatible contract that assures 1r(va, y, vy) to the principal. Note, we 
cannot apply directly the proof of Proposition 31 because we have the one-sided lack of 
commitment constraint 1r y ::; O, that impedes changing period l wages. So we will focus 
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o n peri od zero wages. Suppose that the gain is after peri od O low output realization ( the 
other case is trivial). Define w'(O) = w(O) + z and w'(O) = w(O) + ~· Now, along the 
lines of the last part of the proof Proposition 31 we can show that it is always possible 
to choose the transfers z such that incentive compatibility is maintained, i.e. 
log (w')+ f3U* -log (w')- f3U = log (w)+ f3U* -log (w)- f3U* 
or 
such that the principal has zero ex-ante expected profits and such that the agent's t= O 
expected utility is increased. This implies that W where not optimal, a contradiction. • 
Remark 7 The following result seems robust to N outputs, unfortunately the additivity 
of the value function W given by the log-utility assumption, appears important also to 
show recursivity. Finally, more actions should not be a problem as long as there is a sori 
of concavity that avoid conterintuitive results. 
5.3.2 Results 
Off-the-equilibrium path 
First we can focus on the constant A. In our model the off-the-equilibrium path effects 
are summarized by the inclusion of an additive constant into the incentive compatibility 
constraint. 
Assumptions (C) (i) f(G,aL) = f(B,aL) (ii) f(B,aL) = f(B,aH) = f(B). 
Proposition 34 Under {A}-(B}-{C} A(v,~, ~,Q) 2:: O 
Proof. From (C (ii)) we have f; = v0 regardless the period O output realization and 
p(I/o) = f(B). Now we have 
A(v,~,~,Q) p(vo)D(v, ~) + (l - f3(v 0 )) D(y_, Q) 
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c [!(B)p(~)- '!~) + (1- f(B)) p(vo)- '!(~)] 
p(v) - p(v) p(~) -p(~) 
c [!(B) (vo; v) + (1- f(B)) vo:!!.] 
c [vo (!(B)~+ (1- f(B)) D -l] 
> c [f(B)V + ~0- f(B))!!.- l] 
> c [ vo - 1] =O 
f(G,aH)v+ (1- f(G,aH))~ 
where the second line is given by the definition of D(:y_, [!_) and assumption (B), the third 
line is an algebraic rearranging that uses (C (ii)), fourth line is again an elementary 
algebraic manipulation, the inequality in the fifth line is given by Jensen's inequality and 
the fact that the transformation g( x) = ~ is convex, the sixth inequality is given by the 
fact that under (A) and (C) f(B) ~ f(G,au) and (5.16)-(5.17) givev ~ ~· Finally, the 
properties of the Bayesian rule give the last equality. • 
Proposition 34 describes a new effect, absent in the existing literature. Under as-
sumption (C) the incentive compatibility costs increases because in designing the op-
timal contract the principal has to take into account possible off the equilibrium path 
posteriors that may induce the agent to take actions different from the prescribed one. 
Nonstationarity 1: Human Capitai Shocks and Incentives 
Once this off-the-equilibrium-path behavior effect is cleaned out the analysis can be 
thought as a dynamic model of moral hazard with exogenous shocks that affect the 
second period output distribution (parametrized by the posterior v). Here we first ana-
lyze the implications of such nonstationarity in the implementation costs. Consider the 
participation constraints, from Proposition 33 can be rewritten as 
(p- p) (log (w)+ (3V (1f, v) -log (w)- (3V (zc, ~)] ~c (l+ (3A(v,~, D,Q)), 
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further, using the closed form solution (5.21) we can simplify them and write 
w h ere 
(p- p) [log (w)+ ,Blog (E [y l v] -1f) -log (w) -log (E [y l~] -K)] 
> c ( 1 + ,BA(v, ~, r;, Q)) - (p -p) ,BI(v, !!.) 
I(v,~) = B(v)- B(~). 
(5.23) 
So I summarizes the effect of different posteriors on the incentive compatibility con-
straints. Suppose, for the moment, we do not have the one-sided limited commitment 
constraints 1r y ~ O. The first or der condi tions for profi ts are 
Using first order conditions for wagcs and assuming intcriority, we obtain 
E [y l~] -1!: 
E [y 1 v] -n. 
Now use the participation constraint and rearrange terms, we get 
w = E [ l v] - 1f = E [y l va] - 7ro 
- y - - (l- p)+ pkl ' 
\v h ere 
k1 =- = exp 
w {c (l+ ,BA(v,~, I;, Q))- (p- p) I(v,~)} 





The sign of I is difficult to define. The reason is that the posterior affects I in many 
ways. Recalling that in the repeated case I = O then we have two possible results. Look 
at equations 5.26 and 5.27. 
Case (a) I > O, insurance. Compared with the rcpeatcd case, when I > O the wage 
127 
scheme decreases the slope an d increases the low output wage w. This is given by the 
fact that the agent is already penalized when the outcome is low so the wage is used 
to insure the agent against the possibility of higher implementation costs in the second 
peri od. 
Case (b) I < O, incentives. Here if low output occurs then the implementation costs 
are lower so the agent has incentives to supply low effort and increase the probability of 
this lo\v output event. In order to keep the incentives the wage slope is increased and w 
is red uced \VÌ t h respect t o the repeated case. 
\Ve found that what determine the sign of I are conditions on the productivity ma-
trix F. In synthesis, w ha t matters is whether being go od means having high marginai 
pro d ucti vi ty. 
N onstationarity 2: Intertemporal Inefficiency. Incentives versus human capi-
tal insurance. 
Now we focus the study to the effect to the one-sided lack of commitment. Here the 
interpretation is given by the mixed nature of our model. 
I<uhn-Tucker slackness conditions in1ply (i) if 1r < O, then the one-sided lack of con1-
Initment constraint on profits is not binding ancl 
w= E [y l v]- 1r, 
which is the optimality condition for full-intertemporal consumption smoothing. (ii) If 
1r = O and the associateci multiplier is positive then 
w > E [y l v] - 1r 
ancl is not possible for the agent to obtain full-intertemporal consumption smoothing. 
Whether the first case happens in states where the output realization is low or high 
depcnds o n the tracle-off between the agent 's desire to insure him against bad shocks in 
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human capitai endowment an d the need to give himseif incentives t o make "credibie" the 
contract. Again we have two cases. 
Case (a), incentives dominance. If the career concerns effect is not enough to give 
incentives to the agent to take high effort action, then the optimai scheme sets 7f < O = K 
and one-sided Iack of commitment constraint is binding for Iow output reaiizations. 
Case (b), insurance dominance. If career concerns give more than the optimai amount 
of incentives t o the agent then profits (i. e. wages) are used to insure the agent against 
bad lnunan capitai shocks and we have 7f = O > K· 
Case (a) emerges in repeated moral hazard models with one-sided lack of commitment 
(w bere the human capi tal shocks are absent), case (b) is the effect found in Harris-
Holmstrom (1982)[58)'s model (where the incentive rnotives are absent). 
Other results vVe finish the section with a simple proposition that emphasizes the 
advantages of our approach that, in son1e respect is dual to the classica! Principal-Agent 
approach, in that we assurne the agent has the whole bargaining power. For example, 
Phelan (1993)[102) could not prove the next proposition for the repeated moral hazard 
n1odel. The gain \vith our approach is that the promise keeping constraint is linear. 
Proposition 35 If the model can be written in recursive from and the principal is risk 
neutral~ then the (unconditional) mean of agent 's w age is increasing in tenure, i. e. 
E[w(O)]:::; E[w(1)). 
Proof. In the repeated case we have: 
7ro = E[y(O) - w(O) + f)1r] 
so frmn 7fo = O and the one-sided constraint 1r :::; O ==> E[y] 2:: E[w(O)), but the zero-profit 
conditions for firms in1ply that next period average wage satisfies E[w(l)) 2:: E[y), the 
desired result. This remains true also for our career concerns case because the Bayesian 
learning rule has constant unconditional rnean. •· 
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Remark 8 The proposition is true for any utility function and regardless the validity of 
assumptions ( A)-(B )-(C). The only requirement is the recursive formulation and the 
risk neutrality of the principal. 
5.4 Conclusions 
We presented only preliminary results. So we use this last section to give intuition about 
the main extensions we have in mind. 
vVe conjecture both the closed form solution and the career concerns analysis can be 
extended to the generic N outputs case. To see why it works for the repeated case denote 
Pi (a) the conditional probability of output i realization, given t ha t action a is taken. For 
the two actions case: the incentive compatibility constraint of the recursive problem can 
be written as 
N 
:L (pi(aH)- Pi(aL)) ((1- !3) log(wi) + f)V(1ri)) 2: c- c. 
i=O 
vVe guess the solution is of the form Wi = wri where w is a base wage chosen to satisfy the 
participation constraint in period t, and ri are constants that summarize the (relative) 
slopes, chosen to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint. We further guess the 
value function is, similarly to the two outputs case, V(1ri) = log (E [y]- (1- !J) 1fi) +B. 
Then from optimality condition we can rewrite the participation constraint as 
N 
log(w) :L (Pi(aH)- Pi(aL)) li 2: c- c, 
i=O 
where li = log ri. 
The case with more than two actions is no t so easy because of wealth effects. However, 
we conjecture once the action to be implemented is chosen, then the optimal wage scheme 
reduces to a two actions problem (the one implemented and thc "closest" action) where 
for "closest" action we mean the o ne for which the participation constraint binds. These 
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and other extensions are left for future research. 
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